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ABSTRACT 
 
Intellectual property rights have become an integral issue to international trade due to 
the pressure from developed countries. Developing countries are usually reluctant to 
adopt advanced measures of IPR protection because of their limited capacities. 
However, they have been pressured to accept the TRIPS Agreement as part of the 
WTO single undertaking. Nevertheless, developed countries are still dissatisfied with 
the multilateral level of IPR protection. Developed countries are thus pursuing free 
trade agreements that include IPR measures beyond the TRIPS, known as the TRIPS 
Plus. The U.S. FTAs are famous with their ambitious TRIPS Plus provisions. Those 
provisions raise fears in many developing countries about the effects of the TRIPS 
Plus trends. However, the U.S. has managed to enter into FTAs with many developing 
countries which are motivated by political and commercial benefits. Egypt has very 
special relations with the U.S. and thus the possibility of an FTA was examined 
informally by both countries. These FTA preparations were terminated for 
undisclosed political reasons. The probability of a sudden revival of the FTA 
preparations is omnipresent, thus it is precautionary for Egypt to examine its ability to 
conform to IPR standards in the U.S. FTAs apart from the pressure of negotiations. 
The Egyptian IPR Law is frequently criticized by many developed countries including 
the U.S. for non compliance with the TRIPS measures. This paper will study first 
Egypt's compliance with its international IPR obligations. Second, the paper will 
provide a legal comparison between the Egyptian Law and the U.S. FTAs, with a 
special focus on that of Morocco. Third, the paper will examine policy concerns that 
might hinder Egypt's prospects to join an FTA with the U.S.                                        
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I. Introduction   
Every country must rely on international trade when it seeks economic growth. 
The concept of international trade has been lately extended to include fields that 
formerly belonged to domestic domains such as intellectual property right (IPR), 
investment and competition.
1
 IPR has, therefore, become a common factor in any 
international trade arrangement, whether bilateral, regional or multilateral. The WTO 
has as part of its package of agreements, a specialized agreement on the relationship 
between IPR and international trade. This Agreement is known as the Agreement on 
Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
2
. However, some might 
fairly argue that the world has already moved beyond the TRIPS era, and now it has 
become mature enough to accept TRIPS Plus measures.  
Multilaterally, IPR was dealt with under the umbrella of a U.N. specialized 
organization known as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
3
 This 
organization dealt with IPR from predominantly legal and technical perspectives, 
while international trade was only a side issue. The consecutive rounds of negotiations 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
4
 did not give attention to 
IPR till the Uruguay Round establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).
5
 
Developed countries had been unsatisfied with the WIPO outcomes, and they thus 
sought to give a stronger international push for IPR.  
The prospects of growth of international trade in terms of volume and scope 
were attractive enough to motivate developed countries to insert their IPR interests 
under the GATT umbrella. During the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, 
developed countries managed to insert the issue of IPR in the negotiations agenda, 
                                                
1Hereinafter IPR.  
2Hereinafter the TRIPS.  
3Hereinafter the WIPO.  
4 Hereinafter the GATT. 
5Hereinafter the WTO. 
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despite strong reluctance from developing countries. Developed countries were 
motivated by the lack of a viable enforcement mechanism under the WIPO or any 
other international agency. They also asserted that liberalization of international trade 
should be accompanied by better protection of IPR.      
Conversely, developing countries opposed this inclusion of IPR under the 
GATT for several reasons. First, developing countries were concerned about the 
negative effects of the monopolistic rights conferred by IPR on their access to 
strategic products, especially of essential medicines. Second, restraints to 
dissemination of knowledge necessary to build technological bases also concerned 
developing countries. Third, these countries had no interest in the unnecessary 
insertion of IPR into international trade regime, which would only further complicate 
the Uruguay negotiations. Finally, lack of capacity was a big threat to developing 
countries' ability to comply with their new IPR obligations under the GATT. 
Developed countries responded by granting developing countries great 
flexibilities with respect to their IPR obligations. These flexibilities included 
transitional periods to be granted to developing and least developed countries in 
implementing their obligations. Technical assistance was also promised in IPR areas 
that would be burdensome to developing countries with limited capacities. Moreover, 
a major tradeoff for the IPR obligations was made with developing countries by 
including agricultural products in the multilateral trading system. This inclusion was 
of great significance to developing countries as their agricultural exports had 
competitiveness in developed countries' markets. This competitiveness is based on the 
comparatively cheap labor and raw materials in developing countries. However, these 
exports faced the challenges of trade tariff barriers imposed by developed countries to 
protect the interests of their strong agricultural lobbies.             
 3 
 
The Uruguay Round negotiations were successful in the establishment of the 
WTO, with its list of agreements known as the "Uruguay Package". These agreements 
are binding on all WTO members, as part of the multilateral single undertaking. The 
WTO has also a relatively efficient enforcement mechanism under its subsidiary 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
6
  
Moreover, the "Uruguay Package" included a specialized agreement on the 
relationship between IPR and intentional trade. This agreement is called the WTO 
Agreement on the Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. This 
agreement sets an international precedence of linking IPR to international trade. Its 
obligations take a strictly legal and procedural form. Countries are obliged to change 
their laws in accordance with the TRIPS standards. WTO members are fully free to 
adopt more ambitious IPR provisions than those in the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS, 
however, acts as a benchmark to determine any additional levels of IPR protection.                         
At the preferential level, WTO members can adopt more ambitious standards 
than those in the TRIPS. Such additional standards could be derived from either a 
regional or bilateral agreement that is usually referred to as "free trade agreement" 
(FTA).
7
 Sluggish progress in WTO negotiations has encouraged its members to 
conclude more FTAs. Parties of such FTAs are both developing and developed 
countries. Each country has selected IPR interests that may not be satisfied under the 
WTO TRIPS terms and thus tries to attain more favorable FTAs through bilateral 
negotiations with key trading partners. Favoring the FTA alternative is also because 
negotiation burdens at the bilateral level are less than those at the WTO level. 
                                                
6Hereinafter the DSB.  
7Hereinafter FTA.   
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Bilateral negotiations only address interests of two countries instead of the large 
number of WTO members.     
Developed countries like the U.S. enter into FTA negotiations with developing 
countries to pursue their areas of priority. For the U.S., IPR is one of the key issues, 
especially with respect to FTAs with lesser trading partners like those of the Middle 
East. Lack of proximity of some trading partners limits the scope of trade in 
agricultural goods. The U.S. normally focuses its FTA negotiations on trade interests 
like IPR that aren't hindered by distance. The FTA provisions on IPR are known as the 
TRIPS Plus. These FTAs provisions vastly exceed the level of protection provided by 
the TRIPS and the U.S. FTAs have the highest international level of IPR protection. In 
contrast, the E.C.'s Association Agreements have relatively limited emphasis on IPR 
compared to other issues like trade in agricultural products.   
On the other hand, countries with legal systems that fall short of their TRIPS 
obligations are described as TRIPS Minus. This description applies to countries that 
are currently in the stage of accession to WTO or WTO members that have enacted 
TRIPS deficient IPR laws. The deficiency of the laws is frequently the result of public 
hostility to the TRIPS objectives and effects. TRIPS Minus countries have little 
chance to join FTAs with the U.S. unless there is substantive legal reform to their IPR 
laws. Occasionally, the U.S. enters into negotiations with TRIPS Minus countries 
eliciting strict promises of law reform at later stage.     
Informal joint FTA preparations between Egypt and the U.S. took place in 
2005, but were terminated for unannounced political reasons. It behooves Egyptian 
policy makers to examine the conformity of the Egyptian IPR Law with the IPR 
standards endorsed by the U.S. FTAs in anticipation of future negotiations with the 
U.S. This precautionary examination will be very useful if these FTA preparations are 
 5 
revived one day. The number of Arab countries that are parties to the U.S. FTAs is 
increasing. It is thus reasonable to project a revival of the preparations in the near 
future as a natural outcome of the special political relations between the U.S and 
Egypt. It is also useful to carry out this examination apart from the pressures of 
immediate negotiations with a developed country like the U.S. The intense pressures 
of the negotiations on the Government of Egypt to adopt TRIPS Plus provision, might 
preclude thoughtful examination of the Law. The Egyptian Government needs to be 
well protected against US pressures confronting a pincher with domestic ones. The 
detection of the legal gaps between the Egyptian IPR Law and the U.S. FTAs, will 
facilitate the policy formulation process in Egypt.  
The purpose of this paper is to identify Egypt's vulnerabilities with respect to 
IP standards in the U.S. FTAs. Two steps are necessary: first, the examination of 
Egypt's compliance with its current international IPR obligations, then a comparative 
study between the Egyptian IP Law and the U.S. FTAs.     
 Chapter 1 of this paper provides an introduction to the issue of IPR in the 
context of international trade. It also highlights the purpose and background of this 
paper. 
 Chapter 2 provides an extensive overview of Egypt's current international 
obligations in the field of IPR. This chapter identifies the benchmarks from which 
policy makers can consider the application of further standards. It covers Egypt's 
obligations under the Paris, Berne and Rome Conventions as well as the TRIPS 
Agreement. Egypt isn't yet a member of the Rome Convention, but must accede to this 
Convention before June 2008, as required by the preferential Association Agreement 
with the E.C. and the FTA with the EFTA Group. This chapter includes an 
 6 
examination of the brief IPR provisions encompassed by these preferential 
agreements.        
 Chapter 3 explains major U.S. concerns about IPR protection in Egypt, 
specifically in reference to comments from the U.S. annual reports addressing IPR. 
This Chapter reviews the USTR Section 301 and National Trade Estimate reports. It 
also considers the annual report issued by the International Intellectual Property 
Alliance (IIPA) which is influential on the USTR decision making.
8
 It then considers 
the U.S. concerns expressed at the multilateral level under the WTO trade policy 
review for Egypt. 
 Chapter 4 looks directly at the issue of Egypt's conformity with the IP 
standards in the U.S. FTAs. A legal comparison between the Egyptian IP Law and the 
U.S. FTA with Morocco will be presented. The choice of Morocco was made on 
grounds of its great similarity with Egypt in terms of economic conditions. In 
addition, both Egypt and Morocco are Arab countries with some similar political 
concerns vis –a vis the U.S.      
 Chapter 5 concludes with summary of the areas of the Egyptian policy 
concerning the IPR standards in the U.S. FTAs. A consideration of reports from 
various U.N. organizations will be included. Recommendations for the IPR legal 
reform in Egypt will be provided as well. In conclusion, this paper focuses on the 
vision of the Egypt's prospects of signing an FTA with the US. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8Hereinafter the IIPA.  
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II. Exploring International IPR standards That Are Obligatory to 
Egypt  
 
A. Multilateral Treaties 
1. The Paris Convention
9
     
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property is the oldest 
working IPR legal text, dating from 1883. This Convention was revised several times. 
The latest version was revised at Stockholm in 1967 and amended in 1979. It provides 
protection to all fields of industrial property. The comprehensive approach of this 
Convention was then replaced by that of the WIPO which deals separately with each 
form of industrial property. WIPO treaties cover very specific aspects pertaining to 
one particular field of industrial property, like registration of trademarks or 
classification of patents. The Convention is, almost in whole, incorporated in the 
TRIPS.
10
  
a. Patents 
 Patent provisions under the Convention do not cover all areas pertaining to the 
global patent protection system. The Convention only covers some areas without 
giving precise details concerning, for instance, term of patent protection. The 
Convention covers the priority rights for patents. Such rights make the patent 
applicant entitled to priority in his invention in all countries of the Paris Union. This 
priority has effect in other countries of the Paris Union even if other applications are 
filed by third parties for the same invention.
11
 This priority right is only for a limited 
period of one year from the filing date in the original country.
12
 The second 
application filed by the original applicant in another country of the Union is to be 
                                                
9 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, (20 March 1883), Stockholm Act 
(1967), modified in 1979, Publication of the World Intellectual Property Organization No. 201(E). 
10TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 2.1.   
11Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4.A(1).    
12Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4C(1) – (2).      
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treated as the original application. This second application is completely independent 
of the first one upon which priority is established.
13
 The only link between both 
applications is the priority right enjoyed by the applicant for the second application by 
virtue of the first one. This means that refusal of the first application has no effect on 
the authorities' decision concerning the second application.
14
  
 Inventors shall always enjoy the moral right of attribution of their inventions to 
their names apart from the transfer of economic rights.
15
 The patent is to be treated in 
the abstract. A patent only provides the inventor with a negative right to prevent 
others from making use of the patent without his consent. However, the patent holder 
has to go through other procedures for getting the marketing approval for the patented 
product. The competent authority's decision on marketing approval is without 
retroactive effect on the patent itself. Accordingly, refusal of marketing approval shall 
not prevent the applicant from being granted patent protection.
16
 
 Patent rights are subject to limitations such as compulsory licenses or 
forfeiture. A compulsory license is the first option available to the authorities in the 
face of insufficient supply of the patented product. Under compulsory licensing, 
competent authorities assign third parties to use the patent to fill in the shortage in the 
supply of the patented product. The patent holder does not fully lose his rights to the 
patent. The holder's right to prevent third parties from using the patent only becomes 
conditionally and partially suspended. Compulsory licensing is justified by the 
Convention to avoid abuses of exclusive rights conferred by the patent.
17
 Abuses are 
considered broadly by the Convention. Failure to work is one example of the possible 
                                                
13Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4bis (1).        
14Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4bis (1)-(2).         
15Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4ter.         
16Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4quater.  
17Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(2).          
 9 
grounds for issuing compulsory licenses.
18
 This failure can be a total failure to make 
use of the patent or just insufficient use.
19
 The compulsory license can only be issued 
on the ground of failure to work after "three years from granting the patent or four 
years from the date of application".
20
 This compulsory license is issued unless the 
patent holder demonstrates that external factors forced such failure.
21
 In contrast, 
forfeiture prevents the patent holder from making use of the patent. Forfeiture may 
only be resorted to by the authorities in cases where compulsory licenses fail to reach 
their objectives.
22
 Forfeiture can only be made after two years from the date of 
issuance of the first compulsory license.
23
                                                             
b. Marks 
 Marks and patents share some aspects like priority rights. Otherwise, marks 
are covered by the Convention in specific provisions. Unlike patents, the priority right 
for trademarks under the Convention is only six months from the date of the first 
application.
24
 Marks applications are like patents with respect to their full 
independence even from the country of origin.
25
 Specific provisions assigned to marks 
include the protection of well - known marks. This protection can either be ex officio 
or, at least, upon request of an interested party.
26
 Marks are protected against all acts 
that are likely to cause confusion with the original marks.
27
 The period for which 
owners of well - known marks can request the cancellation of their registration is "five 
years from the date of this registration".
28
 However, such a period of limitation isn't 
                                                
18Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(2).          
19Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(4).           
20Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(4).           .  
21Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(4).           
22Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(3).           
23
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(3).                  
24Paris Convention, supra note 9,, at Article 4C(1) – (2).       
25Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6.       
26Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6bis(1).        
27Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6bis(1).        
28Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6bis(2).        
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binding on owners in cases of bad faith.
29
 "Trade names shall also be protected 
whether or not they form parts of marks".
30
 Goods infringing marks or trade names 
shall be seized or at least prohibited from importation.
31
 Seizure could either be upon 
request of an interested party or ex officio by the competent authority.
32
 This 
prohibition of importation does not apply to goods in transit trade.
33
 The seizure must 
also take place inside the country where the infringement of the mark happened.
34
    
c. False Indications 
 The Convention provides some measures to combat false indications. False 
indications can either be for "the source of the goods or the identity of the persons 
interested in the good whether the producer, manufacturer, or merchant".
35
 Persons, 
whether natural or legal, are considered to be interested parties.
36
 The false indication 
of source can be for either the locality or country of the good.
37
 The geographical 
indication (GI) is a subsidiary area to false indication that was later introduced to 
international trade.  
The major difference between false indications of source and GIs lies in the 
factor of the geographical place of production of the good as emphasized by the latter. 
Geographical indication is thus a specification of the wider concept of false indication 
of source. To elaborate, if the indication of source involves a false indication of the 
geographical region of its production, then an infringement of a GI occurs.  
 
 
                                                
29Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6bis(3).            
30Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 8.             
31Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 9(1)&(5).             
32
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 9(3).            
33Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 9(4).            
34Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 9(2).             
35Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 11(1).              
36Paris Convention, supra note 9,at Article 10(2).              
37Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 10(2).              
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d. Industrial Designs 
 Industrial designs are not covered in the Convention in much detail with 
respect to duration and rights conferred by protection. Generally, the Convention 
states that "industrial designs shall be protected in all countries of the Union".
38
 The 
right of priority for industrial designs is determined by the Convention as six months, 
like that of marks.
39
 Forfeiture of industrial designs protection is prohibited by the 
Convention on any grounds.
40
 Meanwhile, the Convention is silent about compulsory 
licensing for industrial designs.                       
e. Unfair Competition 
 The Convention covers the issue of unfair competition in an extremely broad 
manner that would later be the TRIPS foundation of the legal justifiability of the 
protection granted to all forms of IPR. However, the reliance on the concept of fair 
competition varies from one IPR form to another. Fair competition is more assertively 
referred to in provisions covering some particular IPR forms like undisclosed 
information and indications of source. The Convention, in turn, only provides the 
obligation to prevent acts of unfair competition, especially those related to 
misrepresentation of business information.
41
  
The prohibition of misrepresentation of business information in both the 
Convention and the TRIPS aims to protect the public from being misled.
42
 The 
Convention identifies misrepresentation of one's business to include the nature, 
quality, quantity or the characteristics of his goods.
43
 On the other hand, the act of 
                                                
38
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5quinquies.  
39Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4.C(1).   
40Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5.B.  
41Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 10bis(1).   
42Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 10bis(3)3 & TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 22.3.   
43Paris Convention, supra note 9,, at Article 10bis(3)3.   
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misrepresenting information about others can be to either confuse the public or 
discredit others' businesses.
44
                                        
2. The Berne Convention
45
 
 In addition to the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works is another of the oldest IPR legal texts in the world. It 
goes back to the year 1886 and has been revised several times reflecting the evolution 
of copyrights. The current version was reissued under the name of the Paris Act of 
1971, later amended in 1979. However, this Convention is still referred to by its 
historical name "the Berne Convention". The Convention only obliges countries of the 
Berne Union to meet the minimum standards of copyright protection endorsed by its 
provisions. Those countries are fully free to adopt further protective measures in their 
laws.
46
 The same applies to higher standards provided by agreements between 
countries.
47
 
a. Scope of Protection 
 The scope of protection provided by the Berne Convention covers all forms of 
literary, scientific and artistic works.
48
 The Convention drafters, apparently aware of 
the evolutionary nature of copyrights, used concise wording for the scope of copyright 
protection. The Convention, thus, provides a long non – exhaustive list of the possible 
fields of copyrights. However, this list allows for the future adoption of other 
copyright areas like computer programs and compilations of databases. It also sets the 
precedent for segregating the collection from its content. This aspect is mentioned in 
the Convention with reference to encyclopedias and anthologies, where efforts used in 
                                                
44Paris Convention, supra note 9,, at Article 10bis(3) 2-3.    
45 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (9 September 1886), Act 
of Stockholm (1967), Publication of the World Intellectual Property Organization No. 282(E), Paris Act 
(1971) as modified in 1979 Publication of the World Intellectual Property Organization No. 287(E), 
(hereinafter the Berne Convention).  
46Berne, supra note 45, at Article 19. 
47Berne, supra note 45, at Article 20. 
48Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(1). 
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compiling the information deserve their own protection.
49
 This protection of 
compilations is separate from the copyright of their contents.
50
  
b. Rights Conferred 
i. Moral Rights 
 Rights granted under the Convention can be categorized as either moral or 
economic rights. Unlike economic rights, moral rights are non - transferable during 
the author's life and aren't subject to any limitations of any kind.
51
 The author always 
enjoys the right of attribution of the work to his name.
52
 The author also has the right 
to object to any alteration of his work in a manner that could adversely affect his 
public image.
53
 Such alterations are redressable by the author.
54
 Moral rights are also 
enjoyed by his successor in title after his death for at least the duration of protection of 
economic rights for the same work.
55
 
ii. Economic Rights 
 Economic rights have more extensive coverage in the Convention with some 
specificities pertaining to particular forms of copyright. The first among those 
economic rights is the right of translation.
56
 The author has the "exclusive right to 
make or authorize" the translation of his protected work.
57
 This right is subject to a 
limitation that it is only enjoyable by countries declaring themselves as developing 
countries.
58
 Those countries have the right to authorize translation of the protected 
work to the languages prevailing in their territories.
59
 This is only allowed by the 
                                                
49Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(5).  
50Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(5). 
51Berne, supra note 45, at Article 6bis(1).  
52Berne, supra note 45, at Article 6bis(1).  
53Berne, supra note 45, at Article 6bis(1). 
54
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(3).   
55Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(2).  
56Berne, supra note 45, at Article 8.   
57Berne, supra note 45, at Article 8.   
58Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(1).    
59Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(2)(a).     
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Convention if the author has not made or authorized the translation within three years, 
or if the authorized copies are out of print.
60
 This period can be reduced to only one 
year if the translation is carried out in a language that is not the same as that of any of 
the developing countries members to the Convention.
61
 This exceptional right granted 
by the authorities to third parties is not exclusive or transferable.
62
  
 The second economic right is the exclusive right of reproduction of the 
original copy created by the author.
63
 The core principle in this regard is to secure the 
author's right to authorize making his work available to the public.  Reproduction can 
take several forms including broadcasting or cinematographic adaptation.
64
 Other acts 
of reproduction are only applicable to specific forms of copyright and are thus treated 
separately under the provisions of the Convention. For example, "authors of dramatic 
and musical works shall enjoy the exclusive right to authorize the public performance 
or any communication to the public of this performance of their protected works".
65
 
Moreover, authors of artistic works and manuscripts enjoy the consistent right to a 
share in all the resales made after the original transfer of his economic rights.
66
 
The third economic right is the right to authorize adaptations, arrangements 
and other alterations of the protected works.
67
  The fourth is the author's right to 
enforce protection for his works through legal proceedings available under the 
legislation of each country.
68
 Infringing copies of the protected works are to be seized 
by the countries whether in their domestic markets or on importation.
69
 The 
Convention is not specific about the nature of such proceedings and other alternatives 
                                                
60Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(2)(a)-(b).     
61Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(3)(a).      
62Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(1).     
63Berne, supra note 45, at Article 9(1).    
64
Berne, supra note 45, at Articles 11bis & 14.     
65Berne, supra note 45, at Article 11(1).     
66Berne, supra note 45, at Article 14 ter.      
67Berne, supra note 45, at Article 12.       
68Berne, supra note 45, at Article15. 
69Berne, supra note 45, at Article 16. 
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or complementary administrative procedures. This might explain the presence of the 
detailed enforcement provisions in the TRIPS Agreement. 
c. Terms of Protection 
 The term of protection of copyright is the author's life plus fifty years after his 
death.
70
  For joint works, the computation of the term of protection starts from the 
death of "the last surviving author".
71
 If the author's life is unavailable, the benchmark 
for computing the term of protection is replaced by an alternative method. 
Specifically, the term of protection then becomes fifty years from the date of making 
the work available to the public.
72
 This alternative method would cease to apply if, 
under any circumstances, the author's name becomes available during the term of 
protection.
73
 The term of protection for photographic works and works of applied arts 
is twenty five years from the date of making.
74
                                                                    
3. The Rome Convention
75
  
 The International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations was completed in Rome in 1961. This 
Convention covers forms that are considered integral to the international IPR 
protection regime. The peculiar nature of this Convention is that it includes forms that 
are not always compatible with the conventional conceptualization of IPR, which 
covers products that are the creation of the human mind. The intangibility of these 
creations makes them different from ordinary trade in goods. Nevertheless, they 
cannot be neglected in commercial law as they hold a considerable value added in all 
economic activities. Questions arise with respect to the applicability of IPR 
                                                
70Berne, supra note 45, at Article 7(1). 
71Berne, supra note 45, at Article 7bis.  
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intangibility to forms of related rights like producers of phonograms. The 
entrepreneurial character of phonogram production cannot be compared to the 
creativity effort of copyright authors. These phonogram producers, rather, profit from 
the creations of others (the authors). They provide only the financial and managerial 
leverage necessary to make the creations economically rewarding for the creators.  
a. Scope of Protection (National Treatment) 
 The wide scope of protection provided by the Convention is already stated in 
the title of the Convention which provides protection to performers, producers of 
phonograms and broadcast organizations. There are sub - scopes in each of the three 
fields. All types of protection fall under the principle of national treatment. For 
performers, protection is offered by the Contracting States according to the criteria of 
place of performance or incorporation of the performance in any of the other two 
fields of related rights.
76
 Performance in one of the Contracting States entails 
protection regardless of the nationality of the performers.
77
 Incorporation of the 
performance into either phonograms or broadcasts doesn't derogate from the 
protection granted to performers under the Convention.
78
  
 For producers of phonograms, the eligibility for protection depends on either 
the nationality of the producer, fixation or publication of the phonogram.
79
 Nationality 
lies in the simple concept of national treatment, in which protection is granted to 
nationals of other Contracting States.
80
 The other two grounds of national treatment 
for producers of phonograms are based on the place of production, regardless of the 
nationality of the producers.
81
 Those two grounds of national treatment acts can either 
                                                
76
Id, at Article 4.  
77Rome, supra note 75, at Article 4(a).   
78Rome, supra note 75, at Article 4(b)-(c).  .   
79Rome, supra note 75, at Article 5. 
80Rome, supra note 75, at Article 5.1(a).  
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be the first fixation or publication in another Contracting State.
82
 Any State can, 
however, choose not to apply either the fixation or the publication criterion.
83
   
 For broadcasting organizations, national treatment can be granted according to 
the place of either the business headquarters or transmission.
84
 The place of business 
is where the headquarters of the organization are established in another Contracting 
State.
85
 The place of transmission acts as a ground for national treatment under the 
Convention if the transmitter is placed in another State of the Rome Union.
86
 A State 
can, as in the case for producers of phonograms, choose to apply both criteria.
87
 In 
such a case, for an organization to be eligible for protection it must have its 
headquarters and transmit in the same State.
88
 As the case for performers and 
producers of phonograms, the nationality of the organization is not a prerequisite to 
protection.  
b. Rights Conferred 
 Rights conferred differ depending upon the field of related rights. They are all 
described in the Convention as the minimum rights. This implicitly encourages or at 
least enables Contracting States to adopt further measures. Performers have the right 
to authorize the acts of fixation, reproduction and public availability.
89
 The latter can 
be done by either broadcasting or other means of communication to the public.
90
 
Producers of phonograms "have the right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect 
reproduction of their phonograms"
91
. The performers and producers are also entitled 
to a "single equitable remuneration" for secondary uses other than those initially 
                                                
82Rome, supra note 75, at Article 5.1(b) – (c).   
83Rome, supra note 75, at Article 5.3.  
84Rome, supra note 75, at Article 6.1.   
85Rome, supra note 75, at Article 6.1(a).    
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87Rome, supra note 75, at Article 6.2.  
88Rome, supra note 75, at Article 6.2. 
89Rome, supra note 75, at Article 7.1.  
90Rome, supra note 75, at Article 7.1. 
91Rome, supra note 75, at Article 11.   
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destined by the performance or production.
92
 This remuneration is specifically 
required with respect to broadcasts or other means of making their performances or 
phonograms available to the public.
93
  Broadcasting organizations have the right to 
authorize or prohibit the rebroadcasting, fixation or reproduction of their broadcasts.
94
 
c. Terms of Protection 
 The term of protection prescribed under the Convention for any of the three 
fields of related rights is twenty years.
95
 For performers, this term is computed from 
the date of either the performance or the incorporation of the performance in a 
protected phonogram.
96
 For producers of phonograms, the computation starts from the 
date of fixation.
97
 For broadcasts, it starts from the broadcasting date.
98
 Notably, this 
term is stated in the Convention as the "minimum duration of protection", which paves 
the way for increasing this term under the TRIPS.
99
            
4. The WTO TRIPS Agreement 
 The TRIPS Agreement presents the benchmark for any given IPR law of any 
of the WTO members including Egypt. Any WTO member is free to go beyond the 
TRIPS standards or levels of protection as long as there is no contravention to its 
provisions.
100
 Members are practically and legally expected to draft their laws in view 
of the TRIPS. The country can then insert additional levels of protection that build on 
those specified by the TRIPS. This Agreement, unlike the WIPO approach which 
treats each form of IPR separately, treats IPR as a whole.  
 
                                                
92Rome, supra note 75, at Article 12.     
93Rome, supra note 75, at Article 12.     
94Rome, supra note 75, at Article 13(a)-(c).      
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Rome, supra note 75, at Article 14.   
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100TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 1.1.  
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 The TRIPS has 73 Articles covering various aspects of IPR including 
administration and procedures pertaining to the mandate of the TRIPS Council. Some 
of the TRIPS provisions, like those on national treatment, most favored nation, 
objectives and general principles, treat all forms of IPR equally. Other TRIPS 
provisions cover only specific IPR forms, in which redundancy with other provisions 
of the WIPO treaties is carefully avoided. This redundancy avoidance occurs only in 
the TRIPS text with respect to WIPO treaties that are accepted widely like the Berne, 
Paris and Rome Conventions. The approach of the TRIPS is thus to build on the 
already existing obligations under the WIPO treaties. This is done by simply 
incorporating the core provisions of each of those treaties in their proper context in the 
TRIPS. 
a. Copyrights and Related Rights 
i. Copyrights 
The part of the TRIPS covering copyright and related rights, begins by 
requiring all WTO members to comply with Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne 
Convention.
101
 The TRIPS then adds measures to those provided by the Berne 
Convention. Forms of copyrights that are not provided by the Berne Convention, like 
"computer programs and compilations of data", are clearly stated by the TRIPS to be 
integral to the copyright scope.
102
 Specific rights are also added, namely "rental rights 
for the public for computer programs and cinematographic works".
103
 Such rental 
rights are not referred to in the Berne Convention. 
  
                                                
101TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 9.1. 
102TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 10. 
103TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 11. 
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 Terms of copyright protection are covered in full detail by the Berne 
Convention.
104
 A further elaboration of such terms is provided by the TRIPS, which 
makes the computation of the term of protection on the basis of the creation of the 
protected work.
105
 This is only the case where, neither the author nor the date of 
public availability is known.
106
 In contrast, the Berne Convention makes the 
computation on the basis of the creation of the work with respect only to 
cinematographic and photographic works.
107
 
ii. Related Rights 
The TRIPS made more substantive contributions in the field of related rights 
than copyrights. The reason for this greater contribution by the TRIPS is that a smaller 
number of countries are members of the Rome Convention compared to the Berne 
Convention. Accordingly, it was not feasible to make a direct incorporation of the 
Rome Convention' provisions in the TRIPS. The TRIPS had, thus, to reiterate some of 
the basic provisions encompassed by the Rome Convention. For example, rights 
conferred to performers
108
, producers of phonograms
109
 and broadcast organizations
110
 
were just reiterated by the TRIPS without any substantial changes.  
 The TRIPS also elevates the status of protection in other provisions of the 
Rome Convention. This elevated protection deals with terms of protection for both 
performers and producers of phonograms. These terms are raised by the TRIPS to fifty 
years instead of twenty years as provided by the Rome Convention.
111
 The basis of 
computation for the terms of protection of related rights, unlike those in the case of 
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111TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 14.5, Rome, supra note 75, at Article 14.  
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copyrights, are the same in both the TRIPS and the Rome Convention.
112
 Meanwhile, 
the twenty year term of protection that is provided by the Rome Convention "from the 
end of the year in which the broadcast took place" is kept unchanged.
113
 
b. Trademarks 
 Although the Paris Convention extensively covers various aspects pertaining 
to marks, the TRIPS added a limited number of provisions that are effective in 
strengthening the protection. Above all, the TRIPS has made a terminological change 
from the frequent reference to "marks" by the Paris Convention to "trademarks". This 
shift actually suits the contextual nature of the TRIPS' being part of the international 
trade regime. The TRIPS sets a term of protection for trademarks of seven years, to be 
renewable indefinitely.
114
 It also extends the protection of well known marks to 
services, while the Paris Convention limits the protection to goods.
115
 This protection 
offered by the TRIPS is ambitious as it requires no registration and has to be carried 
out ex officio by members.
116
  
The TRIPS makes a more decisive requirement than that of the Paris 
Convention regarding the distinctiveness of the marks.
117
 The TRIPS gives WTO 
members the option of requesting that marks are visually perceptive in order to be 
eligible for protection.
118
 The TRIPS makes the application of border measures to 
trademarks obligatory.
119
 In contrast, the Paris Convention lists a number of options 
with respect to seizure on importation.
120
 The first option is the seizure on importation 
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upon request of an interested party or ex officio.
121
 The second option is the 
prohibition of importation where the law of the member does not permit the seizure.
122
 
The third option is a temporary one that does not apply to Egypt anymore. It grants 
nationals of a country of the Paris Union the same protection granted to nationals of 
any other country, if the laws of the latter do not permit seizure or prohibition of 
importation.
123
  
The TRIPS is clear that the owner has the right to assign his trademark with or 
without the transfer of the business to which the trademark belongs.
124
 This provision 
replaces the optional character of this obligation under the Paris Convention.
125
 
Compulsory licenses for trademarks are prohibited by the TRIPS, where the Paris 
Convention leaves this point unclear.
126
                                         
c. Geographical Indications (GIs) 
 The inclusion of this form of IPR in international trade is attributed to the 
TRIPS. The Paris Convention only provides protection against false indication of 
source, without a reference to the term of GI. Rather, it presents the terms indications 
of source and appellations of origin as objects of industrial property.
127
 In contrast, the 
TRIPS provides for full coverage of GIs. However, a controversy over the level of GIs 
protection took place in the Uruguay Round while drafting the TRIPS. This 
controversy led to a compromise in the text of the TRIPS, which is currently full of 
contradictions and ambiguities. This compromise explains the TRIPS' flexibility with 
respect to the system of GIs protection offered by each member. WTO members may 
choose any legal system under which GIs would be protected, as long as the TRIPS 
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standards are met. This TRIPS flexibility is different from its precise requirements for 
the protection of other IPR forms like patents. 
The TRIPS provisions include the definition of GIs, which specifies "goods 
attributed to some geographical area".
128
 Examples of such GIs include goods like 
Cheddar cheese and Bordeaux wine. Exceptions to GIs protection are clearly specified 
in the TRIPS. These include an "exception to the protection of GIs for wines and 
spirits, that were continuously used in good faith for at least ten years before the entry 
into force of the TRIPS".
129
 Another exception covers some acts pertaining to 
trademarks that are identical or similar to GIs. Despite the overlapping with GIs, 
trademarks may be entitled protection if they are registered, applied for or used in 
good faith, before either the implementation of the TRIPS or the date of GI protection 
in the country of origin.
130
 Moreover, WTO members are not obliged under the TRIPS 
to offer protection to GIs that are not protected in the country of origin.
131
 
However, other TRIPS provisions on GIs may produce confusion regarding 
the two levels of protection. A review of the historical context of drafting the TRIPS 
can help eliminate some of this confusion. The negotiators were divided over GIs into 
proponents and opponents. The proponents of GIs in general include countries in what 
is known as the Old World, vis -a- vis, those of the New World. The latter term refers 
to countries that were discovered in the mid - centuries including the Americas, 
Australia and New Zealand. Before discovery, such countries had not developed the 
human communities that exist today, and thus, they are unlikely to have their GIs 
now. This is due to the fact that a GI is an accumulative gift to a particular community 
that develops over generations. The Old World has a lot of interests in GIs, whereas 
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the New World acts as a free user of GIs. Legitimate grounds for such use are, 
however, claimed by the New World.  The current inhabitants of many of the New 
World countries are descendants of the Old World, particularly from Europe. 
Accordingly, the New World seeks to prevent Europe from claiming exclusivity to 
GIs that are currently shared by descendants of the same European origins.   
These negotiations led to a compromise between two levels of GI protection. 
The initial level now includes all GIs except those for wines and spirits. At this level, 
WTO members are obliged to prevent the use of GIs where the public is being misled 
about the true origin of the product.
132
 This means that except for wines and spirits, 
members may allow the use of foreign GIs in their territories. The users have to 
clearly state the true place of production which may be different from the one implied 
by the GI. For example, a Danish company can produce the Egyptian Damietta 
cheese, as long as the consumers in Denmark are not misled to believe that it was 
produced in Egypt. The additional level of GIs protection is only granted by the 
TRIPS at the current stage to wines and spirits.
133
 Under this additional level, even the 
mention or reference in the course of trade of any kind of the protected GIs for wines 
or spirits is prohibited.
134
 Members are obliged to offer GIs protection upon request of 
an interested party, while they have to ex officio protect GIs incorporated in 
trademarks.
135
 The TRIPS doesn't specify any term of protection for GIs, as the 
termination of protection after the lapse of this term does not suit the accumulative 
nature and the generic proprietorship of GIs. 
The TRIPS has a different mandate to the TRIPS Council regarding future 
negotiations on each of the two levels of GIs protection. For the first level of GIs 
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134TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 23.1.   
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protection, the language of the provisions on the future negotiations is less mandatory 
than those of the additional level. Members are instructed by the TRIPS to enter into 
negotiations to increase the scope of the additional level of protection that is currently 
granted to wines and spirits.
136
 The real target of this negotiations mandate is the 
elevation of the first level of GIs protection to the additional one. The language of the 
provisions on the negotiations mandate for the additional level is much stronger and 
straightforward. The provisions on this additional level instruct the "TRIPS Council to 
hold official negotiations on the establishment of the multilateral system of 
notification and registration of GIs for wines and spirits".
137
 The objective of this 
multilateral system is only to facilitate and not elevate the protection.
138
 This 
multilateral system is also voluntary with respect to participation. Members are not 
obliged to furnish notification of their GIs for wines or spirits in the event that they do 
not have any or are disinterested.
139
    
d. Industrial Designs 
 The TRIPS makes substantial additions to measures for industrial design 
protection offered by the Paris Convention. The TRIPS specifies novelty or originality 
as the test for protection.
140
 A clear distinction is made between industrial designs and 
patents. Protection offered to industrial designs must not be extended to technical or 
functional aspects.
141
 Rights conferred to owners of industrial designs are listed. Such 
rights are similar to patents and unlike copyrights. Both patents and industrial designs 
give their owners the "negative rights". These rights grant the owners the privilege of 
preventing "third parties from making, selling or importing goods bearing their 
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industrial designs without their consent".
142
 An infringement can consist of either 
copycatting the entire design in full or by partially copying a substantial part.
143
 The 
rights conferred by the ownership of industrial designs are, however, subject to limited 
exceptions usually described as the three step test. The steps are: exceptions are 
limited, don't prejudice either the exploitation rights or legitimate interests of the 
owners.
144
 The duration of protection is specified to be at least ten years.
145
             
e. Patents 
i. Scope and Definition of Patents 
 This form of IPR is one of the most important to developed countries' interests. 
This importance explains the extensiveness and substantiality of the TRIPS provisions 
on patents compared to other IP forms like industrial designs. The TRIPS Patents 
Section starts by defining patents
146
. This definition sets three conditions for an 
invention to be considered as a patent and thus be protected by its rights conferred by 
the TRIPS
147
. Those conditions are novelty, inventive step and industrial 
applicability.
148
  
Some of the conditions may be changed to suit legal systems in some 
developed countries. Novelty could be replaced under the TRIPS by non – 
obviousness, while industrial applicability could be replaced by utility.
149
 Such 
changes primarily reflect different scopes for patents applied for in different countries, 
which in some cases, include agricultural inventions. The TRIPS definition also grants 
protection for patents for both processes and final products.
150
 The Paris Convention 
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doesn't specify inclusion of patents for final products. The TRIPS also mentions that 
patent protection applies to all fields of technology without prejudice to the place of 
invention.
151
  
 Exclusions from patentability suit the particular nature of patents, those which 
might have serious adverse effects on the environment or public order.
152
 Inventions 
of such effects are not granted protection under the TRIPS.
153
 Other exceptions have 
more serious implications as they cover fields of technology granted optional 
protection by WTO members. All other fields except those specified are to be granted 
obligatory protection. The excepted fields are diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods for the treatment of humans or animals.
154
 The same also applies to plants 
and animals other than microorganisms.
155
  
For new plant varieties, members are obligated to grant protection either 
through patents, a sui - generis system or combination thereof.
156
 The reason for this 
extremely flexible approach is that developing countries have little experience in this 
regard, since plant varieties haven't been covered by the Paris Convention. Another 
technical reason for this flexibility lies in the fact that agricultural products do not 
meet the patentability conditions for industrial application. In contrast, countries that 
request the utility of the product for eligibility to patent protection will not face 
inadequacy of applying patent conditions to plant varieties. The opposite is true for 
countries that require the condition of industrial application of the product for patent 
approval. Accordingly, it is more appropriate for these countries to protect plant 
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varieties by a sui – generis system rather than patents, as the creation of new plant 
varieties is not an act of industrial application.          
ii. Rights Conferred to Patent Owners   
 Rights conferred by patents are specified in the TRIPS in a manner that is very 
similar to the way rights are conferred for industrial designs except for the issue of 
exhaustion. For product patents, owners have the negative right to prevent third 
parties, not having their consent, from "making, using, offering for sale, selling or 
importing their protected products".
157
 Exhaustion applies to all such rights except for 
the making of the patented product to avoid duplication of rights conferred to 
owners.
158
 Exhaustion opens the door to parallel importation which provides poor 
countries with alternative sources of patented product especially for pharmaceuticals.  
For process patents, owners have rights similar to those of product patents, 
excluding the making of the process, since it is practically inapplicable in this case.
159
 
Another difference is the absence of exhaustion.
160
 A patent is assignable, transferable 
or contractible subject to its owner's consent.
161
 The term of protection is specified as 
twenty years from the filing date. 
162
 This term is not specified in the Paris 
Convention.  
iii. Limitations to Rights Conferred by Patents 
 Despite all rights mentioned above, patent protection has various procedural 
and legal limitations. Procedurally, a patent applicant must submit a clear description 
of the invention.
163
 This requirement serves a couple of objectives. The most 
important objective is the avoidance of "misappropriation of patents" based on 
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information that is already available in the public domain. Another objective is the 
dissemination of knowledge, which is claimed by the TRIPS to be one of its 
priorities.
164
  The requirement also aims at quieting fears shared by developing 
countries regarding adverse effects of the TRIPS on their developmental potential. 
The TRIPS also endorses general exceptions that are similar to those provided for 
copyrights. For such exceptions to be acceptable under the TRIPS Agreement, they 
have to be limited. They also should not conflict with the owner's rights or normal 
exploitation of the patent. The generic wording of such "limited exceptions" compared 
to the explicit wording in compulsory licenses has made them impractical to apply.  
 The most serious and effective exception to patents is compulsory licensing. 
The TRIPS has a long list of conditions for any WTO member trying to use 
compulsory licensing.
165
 However, grounds for issuing such licenses are not 
exhaustively listed in the TRIPS. The TRIPS adjusts some of the grounds for only 
some of the conditions. These adjustments take the form of attaching the grounds to 
particular conditions, or waiving some conditions for some of the grounds. Adoption 
of a compulsory licensing system is not an obligation for members. The obligation 
comes only when the member decides, before using the system, to abide by the 
conditions.
166
 Ironically, the terminology "compulsory licensing" is not referred to in 
the TRIPS. "Other use" (than the limited exceptions) is the description used in the 
TRIPS for compulsory licensing.
167
 WTO documents indicate that the TRIPS 
provisions on "other use" actually deal with compulsory licensing. The Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS and Public Health, as well as, its mandated negotiations 
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explicitly link the conditions of "other use" and the compulsory licensing system.
168
 
The state has authority for issuing compulsory licensing. "Authorization" is the 
method acknowledged by the TRIPS for third parties to be granted compulsory 
licenses.
169
 The compulsory licensee could be either a private third party or the 
government.
170
 The authority competent to issue the license, thus, replaces the patent 
owner in giving the authorization where a ground for compulsory licensing applies.                             
 The conditions for issuing a compulsory license are enumerated in paragraphs 
(a) to (l) of article 31 of the TRIPS. Each of the licenses is considered apart from other 
patented products.
171
 Negotiations with the patent holder should precede the use of the 
system.
172
 Good faith is to be exerted in these negotiations, and reasonable terms 
should be offered to the holder.
173
 The obligation to negotiate can be waived in one of 
three cases: "national emergency, extreme urgency or public non commercial use".
174
 
The waiver of negotiations is adjusted to the nature of the grounds for issuing the 
license. Time availability or commercial purposes will not probably be applicable to 
those three cases to require entering into negotiations with the patent owner before 
issuing a compulsory license.  Negotiations in any of the three cases are replaced by 
another obligation to notify the holder.
175
 In the first two cases, where the time factor 
is critical to meet the purpose of the license, the holder must be notified as soon as 
possible.
176
 In the third case, the holder must be notified promptly as there is no 
reason to justify the delay.
177
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Other conditions for using the compulsory license are not confined to 
particular grounds. Those conditions tend to limit the scope of the system so as not to 
undermine the patent regime. Above all, the right holder must receive adequate 
remuneration computed on the basis of the economic value of the licensed subject 
matter. The purpose of the license must not be exceeded by the licensee.
178
 The 
licensee does not really enjoy any rights except those justified by the objective of 
meeting the exceptional circumstances. This license would terminate once its grounds 
cease to exist.
179
 This termination could also take place after the license ground is 
reviewed by the issuing authority under request of the legitimate holder.
180
 In all cases 
of termination, the legitimate interests of the licensee must also be considered.
181
 The 
license could be issued to several third parties as the license is non – exclusive.182 This 
condition serves the purposes of expanding competition necessary to meet the 
exceptional circumstances. The licensee has the sole right to exploit the license but not 
to assign it to others.
183
 All decisions to issue the license are subject to "judicial 
review by a higher authority".
184
  
The most significant condition is that use of the licenses be "predominantly 
directed towards the supply of the domestic market needs".
185
 Practically this means 
that every country must rely on its resources to produce compulsory licensed products. 
This condition initiated the infamous negotiations over the relationship between the 
TRIPS and public health.
186
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All these conditions are waived in case of anticompetitive practices committed 
by the patent holder.
187
 Logically, limitations to patent rights by compulsory licenses 
emanate from the fact that external factors caused the need for the extra patented 
products. If external factors are involved in the sudden rise in need for the patented 
product, there is no negative reflection upon the patent holder. The opposite is true if 
the holder is inflexible in negotiations on increasing the supply to meet this need, or if 
anticompetitive practices take place. Anticompetitive practices are severe violations of 
the law that would deprive the holder of its patent rights. The extent of the violation 
would determine the degree of deprivation of the privileges granted to the holder. 
Thus the TRIPS leaves this issuance of compulsory licensing on the ground of 
anticompetitive practices for the determination of the judicial authorities in each WTO 
member.
188
 
The compulsory license system is deemed by the TRIPS to be sufficient to 
meet public needs or to combat anticompetitive practices. This explains the 
extensiveness of the TRIPS provisions covering compulsory licensing compared to 
those for revocation or forfeiture. The only requirement for the member to revoke or 
forfeit the patent is the approval of the act by judicial review.
189
 The clear difference 
between compulsory licensing and revocation/forfeiture is the strict legal nature of the 
latter part. Revocation/forfeiture seriously prejudice the holder's rights, whereas 
compulsory licensing only provides confined and temporary limitations to the rights 
conferred by the patent. 
Iv. Burden of Proof for Process Patents 
  The uniqueness of IPR in the realm of international trade has resulted in some 
singular procedural aspects in the TRIPS such as the reverse of the burden of proof for 
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patented processes. The question remains: why does the TRIPS not provide for this 
reverse of the burden of proof for patented products? The answer is: violation of 
patent rights for final products is easily detected compared to patent process. It is 
sufficient for the patent holder to claim that a product with a certain configuration and 
serving a particular function is infringing his patent. The documents of registration of 
the patent for his product can prove his claim. Documents submitted by a holder while 
applying for a patent for his process are not sufficient for proving his rights, as the 
same result could be reached from different processes. The question is then, how do 
the judicial or administrative authorities decide on infringement allegations for 
patented processes? The logical answer is that the producer must share the processes 
used in obtaining the products with the authorities. If the producer shows a process 
that is different from the patented process, then the infringement allegation is 
dismissed. The TRIPS obligation, in this regard, puts forward two scenarios either of 
which is sufficient for the defendant to prove that his process is different from the 
patented one. The first scenario is when the defendant presents a new product to the 
judicial authorities.
190
 The second is when the process is being used by the defendant 
to produce known products but the patent owner fails to uncover the process actually 
used.
191
 Members are free to follow either scenario to substantiate the violation of the 
patented process.
192
 However, it must first be proved that the product resulting from 
the disputed process is identical to that of the patented process.
193
 In all cases, the 
confidentiality of trade secrets of the defendant must be respected.
194
 From the TRIPS 
perspective, this requirement could be legally fulfilled only by applying the provisions 
of undisclosed information.                   
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f. Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits 
 The TRIPS adopted the same approach of copyrights and related rights with 
respect to this field. The main provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in 
respect of Integrated Circuits are incorporated in the TRIPS.
195
 Rights conferred by 
protection of integrated circuits are close to those granted to other forms of IPR. Right 
holders of integrated circuits enjoy negative rights to prevent others from "importing, 
selling or distributing their protected works without their consent".
196
 The difficulty of 
protecting this highly technical IPR form has made the TRIPS provisions flexible with 
respect to its violations. Persons not knowing that a protected layout design was 
incorporated in a product are not liable under the TRIPS.
197
 However, once they learn 
of the presence of the protection they are required to pay the royalty to the holders.
198
 
Compulsory licensing conditions for patents are also applicable for layout designs.
199
 
One major difference between patents and integrated circuits is the more limited 
grounds for compulsory licensing for the latter. The only two grounds allowed to 
members for integrated circuits are public non - commercial use and combating 
anticompetitive practices.
200
 The TRIPS specified the term of protection for layout 
designs as being at least ten years from the filing date.
201
 If the member does not 
require registration, the term has to be computed from the first commercial 
exploitation of the integrated circuit in any place in the world.
202
 Members may also 
terminate the term of protection after fifteen years from the creation of the layout 
design.
203
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g. Undisclosed Information                             
 Undisclosed information is one of the most controversial forms of IPR, thus its 
provisions in the TRIPS are very brief. It is also one of the key factors in all almost all 
U.S. FTAs. The gap between the levels of protection provided to undisclosed 
information by the TRIPS and the U.S. FTAs, reveals the developed countries' 
interests in this particular form. Undisclosed information is the broad phrase that 
encompasses all types of trade secrets. The Paris Convention does not literally or 
substantially address the protection of undisclosed information. Rather, the concept of 
undisclosed information is derived from the Convention Article 10 bis covering unfair 
commercial use. The TRIPS distinguishes between undisclosed information in the 
broadest sense, and test data submitted to authorities competent for granting marketing 
approval for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products.
204
 The TRIPS gives 
significant consideration to defining the subject matter of protection covered by this 
section.  
Undisclosed information must satisfy three conditions in order to be eligible 
for protection under the TRIPS. The conditions all focus on the factor of secrecy: the 
information is secret, has commercial value because of its secrecy and it is kept from 
disclosure by its legitimate possessor.
205
 Additional specific conditions are required 
for test data to be protected by the recipient authorities as undisclosed information. 
The data must include new chemical entities resulting from considerable efforts.
206
 
Submission of such data to the authority upon its request is a prerequisite for granting 
marketing approval.
207
 This means that information voluntarily submitted by the 
possessor to the authorities could lose its protected status. Moreover, information that 
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is well known to the public is not eligible for protection. If conditions are met, 
authorities are obliged to protect submitted data from unfair commercial use and 
disclosure.
208
  
The condition of secrecy is the sharpest difference between undisclosed 
information and data exclusivity. Undisclosed information is the level of protection 
provided by the TRIPS, while data exclusivity is adopted by most developed 
countries. Data exclusivity does not require secrecy as the key factor for eligibility for 
protection. The TRIPS language provides the opportunity for members to issue 
marketing approvals for generic versions of pharmaceuticals in cases where the 
information about them is already disclosed. The central point for avoiding violations 
of the TRIPS obligations is that the disclosure of submitted data is not made by the 
recipient authority. Disclosure may take place away from the recipient authority as in 
the case of reverse engineering performed outside of the country's territory. The 
formulae of the generic versions could even be available on the internet or in medical 
references. Where the legitimate possessor of the information claims that the recipient 
authority has committed the disclosure, many legal systems would put the burden of 
proof upon the claimant. Meanwhile, the TRIPS has not prohibited the authorities 
from granting marketing approval based upon disclosed information. Notably, the 
TRIPS does not specify any terms of protection for undisclosed information. 
h. Enforcement of IPR 
 Enforcement is one of the most crucial contributions of the TRIPS to the 
international IPR regime. It is one of the reasons why developed countries were so 
keen to bring IPR under the umbrella of the WTO. In prior conventions and 
agreements, enforcement provisions were either insufficient or even absent. Even 
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when they existed, the availability of an international enforcement mechanism was 
still questionable. The WTO solved this problem by creating the Dispute Settlement 
Body.  
 Enforcement provisions include criminal and civil remedies, and provisional 
measures. They cover the various aspects needed to give respect to the levels of 
protection prescribed in the previous part of the TRIPS. They also cover both 
domestic markets and borders leaving no gaps for IPR infringement in the course of 
trade. The presence of many optional enforcement measures in the TRIPS stems from 
its Article 1.1. This Article acknowledges the right of WTO members to apply the IPR 
protection as mandated by the TRIPS in harmony with their own legal systems. The 
variety of these legal systems is most diverse with respect to applying the law rather 
than setting out its standards. Another component of the variety of members' legal 
systems is that enforcement, unlike legislation, requires resource facilities that might 
not always be affordable to developing and least developed countries. Accordingly, 
each member has the right to enforce the agreed IPR protection standards of the 
TRIPS within its own capacity and with full regard to its legal system. 
 The TRIPS drafters refrained from elaborating details of enforcement so as not 
to complicate the applicability of its provisions. However, the TRIPS flexibility 
regarding enforcement has generated heavy complaints among WTO members for non 
- complying with the TRIPS provisions on enforcement. These complaints are due to 
the fact that it is very hard for members to agree upon criteria for implementing the 
TRIPS enforcement provisions. In the broadest sense, critics always complain about 
insufficient efforts exerted by the criticized party to ensure enforcement. The latter in 
turn responds with extensive reports about its continuous and rigorous efforts. If the 
criticized party is a developing country member, it usually attributes the whole 
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enforcement problem to lack of resources. Discrediting the sufficiency of the technical 
assistance programs provided by developed countries is also a defense by developing 
countries.  
i. Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies 
The TRIPS gives heavier weight to the pursuit of civil remedies through 
judicial rather than administrative authorities. Members are not supposed to follow a 
predetermined set of detailed rules. Remedies are much more dependant on the 
member's legal system. Members are only required to pay respect to some broad 
guidelines. Basically, all rights holders are entitled access to civil judicial procedures 
to protect their rights. 
 Specifically, judicial authorities should have the right to order all parties of a 
dispute to establish the required evidence on the merits of any case.
209
 This obligation 
does not discriminate between the status of any party.
210
 Authorities here have the 
privilege of placing the burden of proof on any party.
211
 Normally, the party that fails 
to provide the authorities with the required evidence bears the consequences as the 
losing party.
212
 The TRIPS even gives members the option of deciding a case solely 
on the grounds of the content of the complaint, when the responding party does not 
provide the refuting evidence.
213
 
 In addition, judicial authorities have the right to order injunctions aimed at 
preventing the infringing party from its violations.
214
 Injunctions cover all IPR 
infringements, but with a special focus on released imported goods (trademarks)
215
. 
The rationale for this focus on domestic markets is further illustrated by the detailed 
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provisions on members' obligations to apply border enforcement measures. Intent of 
infringement is a prerequisite for the injunction obligation to be mandatory to 
members. The TRIPS gives members the option to exclude persons not knowing of 
the existence of the infringement from such injunctions.
216
 This is true even in case 
where those persons possess or even have ordered the infringing products.
217
 Members 
are free not to apply injunctions in cases of compulsory licenses.
218
 Injunctions may 
be replaced by the adequate remuneration that would be paid to rights holders in such 
cases.
219
 
 Members are obliged to authorize their judicial authorities to order the 
infringing party to pay the right holder damages caused by the infringement. This is 
only obligatory for members with respect to infringers who know about the existence 
of the infringements.
220
 Otherwise, this obligation is optional to members.
221
 Another 
optional measure for members is to order the infringer to pay for judicial expenses.
222
 
Confiscation or destruction of the infringing products or tools used predominantly in 
the course of infringement is optional for judicial authorities
223
. Removal of the 
infringing trademarks is not enough to permit the release of the product to domestic 
markets.
224
 It is also optional for members to order the infringer to disclose any third 
parties involved in producing or distributing the infringing products.
225
 In all cases, 
proportionality should always be maintained between the judicial orders or procedures 
and the seriousness of the harms caused to the right holder.
226
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The defendant is entitled to indemnification if the allegation that he has 
committed an IPR violation appears to be false. This indemnification shall be aimed at 
compensating the defendant from both the damage and expenses accrued by the false 
complaint.
227
 The TRIPS allows members only to exempt their judicial or 
administrative authorities from paying such indemnification to the defendant for 
damage caused by their decisions, if they did not intend to cause that damage.
228
 
Members have the right to implement any of the foregoing obligations by 
administrative rather than judicial procedures.
229
 This is only permissible in the TRIPS 
as long as the same level of remedies is attained.
230
  
ii. Provisional Measures 
 As in the case of civil remedies, the TRIPS obliges members to authorize their 
judicial authorities to order provisional measures.
231
 Such measures aim at either 
preventing an infringement or preserving evidence. Provisional measures can prevent 
the circulation of released products from customs in the domestic market.
232
 The 
applicant must submit available evidence to support its request for the provisional 
measures.
233
 At a further stage, the applicant must also submit all the required 
evidence for the application to proceed.
234
 To prevent abuses, the applicant also has to 
submit a security payment to the judicial authorities.
235
 This deposit can also be used 
to compensate the defendant if the application is revoked or proven to be invalid.
236
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In urgent cases, judicial authorities have the authority to order provisional 
measures without notifying the third party accused of infringement.
237
 The defendant 
shall, however, be notified of the provisional orders as soon as possible.
238
 Once 
notified, the defendant has the right to be heard and to submit counter evidence that 
the application for provisional measures submitted by the claimant is groundless.
239
 
The defendant also has the right to request the initiation of a case within a reasonable 
period of time.
240
 This time can either be determined by the judicial authorities, or 
else, will be 20 working or 31 calendar days.
241
 Where the time limit is not met, the 
ordered measures are revoked.
242
 The defendant has the right of compensation in case 
of revocation of the measures.
243
 As with other civil remedies, members may apply 
administrative procedures when all the preceding obligations are fully met.
244
 
iii. Border Measures 
 Members are obliged to apply border measures to prevent infringing products 
from entering their domestic markets. Ironically, this issue of border measures is the 
only one that can fairly be described as an international trade issue. Most other TRIPS 
provisions deal with matters relevant to domestic jurisdictions. Border measures entail 
the suspension of the release of the goods at the customs gates upon request of an 
interested party.
245
 The measures are only mandatory with respect to importation.
246
 
Their application to exportation is left for each member to decide.
247
 Members are not 
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obliged to apply border measures to goods in transit.
248
 The nature of transit trade 
requires expeditious procedures and the customs authorities have limited control.  
Members are obliged to at least apply the measures to trademarks and 
copyrights.
249
 Applying the measures to other forms of IPR remains optional for 
members.
250
 Inspection of consignments containing products that are subject to IPR 
protection is practical for these two forms. For example, it is hard to carry out border 
inspections for patent infringement as it might require sophisticated technical facilities 
(laboratories) and lengthy processes. The facilities might not be available for customs 
authorities, while the long process could be detrimental to the flow of trade.  
 The TRIPS encompasses some border measures that are similar to those of 
provisional measures for domestic markets. In fact, TRIPS provisions on border 
measures also provide for provisional measures but with a different scope of 
application. Among these provisional measures are the ones concerning submission of 
evidence including a detailed description of the infringed products.
251
 The same is also 
true with respect to payment of a security to prevent abuse of enforcement 
measures.
252
 "Where the suspension application is approved, both the importer and the 
applicant shall be notified promptly".
253
 The allowable duration of suspension is a 
maximum of ten working days from the date of notifying the applicant of approval.
254
 
After this period, the suspended goods are released unless an interested party has 
notified the customs of initiation of a legal case, or provisional measures are 
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ordered.
255
 The suspension period could be extended another ten days with approval 
by the competent authority.
256
      
 The TRIPS obliges the applicant to pay all injured parties compensation for 
harms caused by invalid applications.
257
 Beneficiaries could include the "importer, the 
owner, or the consignee".
258
 This compensation would primarily be settled out of the 
security deposited by the applicant. Additional amounts other than the security could 
also be paid to make up for all the injuries.  
Applicants and importers have equal rights to inspect the suspended goods.
259
 
Trade secrets must, nevertheless, be respected.
260
 The TRIPS makes it optional for 
members to provide the applicant with information concerning all parties involved in 
the infringement.
261
 This could happen if the applicant wins a case regarding the 
substance of the application. The information could cover "names and addresses of the 
importer, consignor and the consignee".
262
 The applicant could also be provided with 
information about the quantity of the suspended goods.
263
 
Members may also provide for ex officio actions by the competent authorities 
to suspend goods suspected of prima facie infringements.
264
 In such a case, both the 
importer and the right holder shall be promptly notified of the suspension.
265
 The 
competent authority may then ask the right holder to provide additional evidence in 
support of the suspension.
266
 In the case of wrongful suspension, the competent 
authorities alone may be exempted from the obligation to pay compensation for the 
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importer.
267
 This exemption applies in the case where the authorities had no deliberate 
intention to harm the importer.
268
 However, this exemption must be handled 
cautiously, as this ex officio action is subject to abuse.  
The same procedures for disposing of the infringing goods out of domestic 
markets are also to be adopted at the borders. Judicial authorities are required to order 
the infringing goods to be either confiscated or destroyed.
269
 The re-exportation of the 
counterfeit goods is prohibited by the TRIPS, unless the infringement is removed.
270
 
De minimus imports for non - commercial use can be exempted from the application 
of border measures. However, the TRIPS does not specify the exact amount of this de 
minimus level.          
  iv. Criminal Remedies 
Criminal remedies are left to be determined by the legal system of each 
member. The intangible benchmark for such remedies is that they serve as a deterrent 
to IPR infringement.
271
 Members are free to limit the application of such remedies to 
trademarks and copyrights.
272
 The application of criminal remedies to other forms of 
IPR is only optional for members.
273
 Expansion of those remedies to other forms is 
suggested by the TRIPS wording where bad faith and commercial scale infringement 
occur.
274
 The remedies could be either imprisonment and/or monetary fines.
275
 
Infringing goods must be disposed out of the market by "seizure, forfeiture or 
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destruction of the goods".
276
 This disposal must also be done to tools predominantly 
assigned to the infringement process.
277
 
B. Bilateral Treaties 
 Egypt is a party of both the Association Agreement with the European 
Communities
278
and the free trade agreement with the EFTA Group.
279
 Both 
agreements have very few IPR commitments compared to those endorsed by the 
multilateral treaties. The only TRIPS Plus provisions that occur in both agreements 
are those obliging their parties to accede to a number of IPR treaties, predominantly 
belonging to the WIPO. This outcome is the result of the Egyptian reluctance to 
accept further IPR obligations. This policy is influenced by the view that IPR may be 
a burden rather than a factor of attraction of foreign investors to the Egyptian market. 
In all cases, both agreements, compared to the U.S. FTAs, include very few IPR 
obligations. This is because the European Continent has other interests in Egypt, like 
trade in agricultural goods and combating illegal immigration.                                        
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III. Egypt's Compliance with its International IPR Obligations    
A. Introduction to the Egyptian IPR Law 
Amending national laws and regulations is an explicit TRIPS obligation that is 
to be carried out within one year of entry into force of the Agreement. This period was 
extended to the year 2000 for developing countries, but the Law was delayed by two 
years due to its onerous preparatory process. Egypt was thus obligated to have issued 
its IPR Law by the year 2000. However, Egypt finally complied with its international 
IPR obligations by issuing its new IPR Law in 2002.
280
 This Law was mainly drafted 
to endorse all measures of the TRIPS Agreement.  
The 2002 Law replaces former IPR laws, namely, the Trademarks Law of 
1939, the Patents Law of 1949 and the Copyrights Law of 1954. The Law is divided 
into four Books.
281
 Book 1 covers patents, utility models, layout designs for integrated 
circuits and undisclosed information. Book 2 covers trademarks, geographical 
indications and, industrial designs and models. Book 3 covers copyrights and related 
rights. Book 4 covers new plant varieties. The main question is the level of standards 
embodied by the new Law, and whether it complies with the TRIPS or also includes 
TRIPS Plus provisions. The TRIPS only provides a set of minimum standards of IPR 
protection that have to be respected by all WTO members. Adoption of additional 
levels of IPR protection is left to the freedom of each member. However, it is not 
acceptable to provide less than the TRIPS level of protection.  
In fact, the Law not only complies with the TRIPS measures, it also includes 
provisions to meet standards of other IPR treaties where Egypt is a member. For 
example, the TRIPS does not include any provisions concerning the relationship 
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between patents, and the rules governing access to genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge as provided by the CBD
282
. This issue is still stuck in 
negotiations in the TRIPS Council. However, the Egyptian Law complies with the 
CBD by directly linking patentability to disclosure of genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge. This link is made in compliance with Egyptian obligations 
under both the TRIPS and the CBD, and according to the Egyptian interpretation of 
their provisions. The Law thus complies with the CBD regardless of the results of the 
negotiations in the TRIPS Council on this issue.   
In addition, Egypt is currently in the final stage of its accession to the 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).
283
 Amendments to 
Book 4 to make it comply fully with the UPOV are currently being considered by the 
Government of Egypt. Notably, the TRIPS obliges the WTO members only to protect 
new plant varieties by any adequate approach. Accession to a particular international 
treaty on the protection of new plant varieties is not obligatory under the TRIPS. This 
particular obligation to accede to the UPOV emanates from the Association 
Agreement and the FTA with the EFTA Group.  
The Law also includes provisions that account for any future IPR 
developments, like the protection of copyright and related rights on the internet. This 
newly emerging area of copyright is not covered by the TRIPS, which was drafted at a 
time where many developing and least developed countries lacked sufficient technical 
and human capacities to deal with internet related issues. It was thus impossible to 
require these countries to be multilaterally committed to offering protection in this 
highly technical area. The most prominent international treaties in this new area are 
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available at: http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm (last visited Sept.18, 
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the WIPO Internet Treaties known as the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).
284
 Egypt is not yet a member 
in either of those two treaties as this membership is not required by the TRIPS. 
However, the Egyptian legislature drafted the Law in a manner that would make 
Egypt ready for acceding to these two Treaties. 
However, the Law has been subject to strong criticism from several developed 
countries. The U.S vigorously criticizes the Law, primarily in its USTR annual 
reports. The U.S. has raised its criticism through numerous unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral channels. The grounds of this criticism vary from non compliance with 
the TRIPS to non – conformity with the U.S. IPR standards. The legal validity of the 
criticism depends on its reasons. In regard to the accusation of non compliance to the 
TRIPS, Egypt finds itself in an embarrassing situation. In contrast, Egypt strongly 
rejects the criticism founded on the U.S. standards. In all cases, the U.S. criticism 
signals Egypt's ineligibility for an FTA unless substantive legal reform is carried out, 
especially in areas of concern for the U.S.           
B. U.S. Unilateral Criticism of Egypt's Compliance with International IPR 
Obligations  
 
The importance of this section for the objectives of this paper is that it 
determines whether Egypt is legally eligible to join an FTA with the U.S. If the 
Egyptian IP Law is fully compliant with only its international obligations, then the 
next matter is to examine Egypt's eligibility to join the FTA. If Egypt is not complying 
with its current obligations, then points of deficiency in the Law should be highlighted 
first, before it considers the adoption of TRIPS Plus measures. Such points of 
deficiency must be evaluated in proportion to their significance in terms of trading 
                                                
284WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996, available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html (last visited Feb 30, 2008), and WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, December 20, 1996, available at: 
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partners' interests. This significance may depend upon the assertiveness of demands 
by these trading partners. For example, the Law has already many TRIPS Plus 
measures like raising the term of protection for trademarks to ten years instead of 
seven as required by the TRIPS. Another example of the TRIPS Plus in the Law is 
raising priority rights for trademarks to one year instead of six months as required by 
the Paris Convention. However, developed countries like the U.S. are not very 
interested in these TRIPS Plus measures endorsed by the Law. The U.S. would prefer 
Egypt's adoption of data exclusivity instead of undisclosed information.  
Therefore, this section explains mainstream international criticism of IPR 
protection in Egypt in terms of legality and enforceability. Special attention must be 
given to criticism raised by the U.S., since its FTAs provide the most sophisticated 
TRIPS Plus measures at the international level. In addition, Egypt has not yet joined 
an FTA with the U.S. It may thus be useful to examine Egypt's conformity with the 
U.S. rather than countries like the E.C that are taken for granted as Egypt's bilateral 
trading partners.   
Criticism from the U.S. takes several forms, the most significant of which may 
be found in the official annual reports issued by the USTR, the main U.S. body 
concerned and authorized with proclaiming FTAs.
285
 The USTR annual reports 
negatively categorize various countries in terms of their deficiencies in IPR protection. 
Those reports are also collective in terms of gathering all USTR comments for all 
countries in a single report. The key USTR reports are Section 301 and the National 
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. Those reports are partially inspired 
by the annual reports issued by the IIPA.
286
 The IIPA is a coalition of U.S. copyright 
                                                
285The Office of the United States Trade Representative. 
286The International Intellectual Property Alliance.  
 51 
holders and it issues its annual reports per each country accused of copyright 
infringements including Egypt.                 
1. The USTR Report 
a. Section 301 
Section 301 Reports for Egypt considered by this paper date from 2002 to 
2007. Earlier reports are insignificant to this research as they were issued prior to the 
new Egyptian IPR Law.
287
 The 2002 Report urged Egypt to expeditiously issue the 
Law and to make some modifications to its drafts that were being publicly 
considered.
288
 The 2002 Report listed Egypt at the "Priority Watch List" which 
implies serious deficiencies in IPR protection.
289
  
The 2003 Report elevated Egypt to the "Watch List".
290
 This improvement of 
Egypt's classification came as the U.S. was then gratified by the issuance of the Law, 
as well as, Egypt's ratification of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).
291
 
Enforcement efforts by Egypt to combat copyright piracy were also praised.
292
 
However, the U.S. was dissatisfied with some of the Law provisions like those 
covering the protection of undisclosed information, as it expected the application of 
the data exclusivity instead.
293
 The Government of Egypt was encouraged to consider 
the inclusion of data exclusivity in the Executive Regulations of the Law that had not 
yet been released.
294
  
                                                
287SPECIAL 301 REPORT, USTR, 2002, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2002/2002_Special_301_Report/a
sset_upload_file567_6367.pdf (last visited Sept.18, 2007).  
288Id, at 20. 
289USTR Special 301 Report  for 2002, supra note 287, at 20. 
290SPECIAL 301 REPORT, USTR, 2003, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2003/2003_Special_301_Report/as
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291Id, at 21. 
295 USTR Special 301 Report  for 2003, supra note 290, at 20 -21.  
293USTR Special 301 Report  for 2003, supra note 290, at 20 -21. 
294USTR Special 301 Report  for 2003, supra note 290, at 20 -21. 
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The classification of Egypt deteriorated in the 2004 Report.
295
 In this Report, 
Egypt was downgraded back to the "Priority Watch List".
296
 The main reason for the 
downgrade was the issuance of marketing approvals for generic versions of U.S. 
patented pharmaceuticals.
297
 The U.S. considered these marketing approvals as 
violations of its patents registered in its territory, as Egypt was still under the 
transitional period prescribed by the TRIPS for developing countries to grant such 
patents by the year 2005.
298
 Direct reference to this violation of the TRIPS was 
deliberately avoided, since Egypt was not yet obliged under the TRIPS to provide 
patents for final products of pharmaceuticals. The principle of territoriality requires 
that registered patents are by no means obligatory or enforceable outside the country 
of registration. The US criticism was founded on a mixed TRIPS and TRIPS Plus 
grounds. The U.S also expressed frustration with the delay in issuing the Executive 
Regulations for Book 3 of the Law covering copyrights and related rights.
299
 The U.S. 
had another concern about the deficiency in copyright enforcement in Egypt.
300
 
The 2005 Report maintained Egypt on the "Priority Watch List", alleging 
violations by the Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population of its TRIPS obligations 
to protect test data from unfair commercial use.
301
 The Report did not mention the fact 
that this obligation is limited by a series of conditions including the secrecy of the 
submitted data. The Report was made with the aim of pressuring Egypt to apply 
TRIPS Plus measures. The U.S. also sought a new requirement: coordination between 
                                                
295SPECIAL 301 REPORT, USTR, 2004, available at:  
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_Special_301/asset_upl
oad_file16_5995.pdf (last visited Sept.18, 2007). 
296Id.   
297USTR Special 301 Report  for 2004, supra note 295, at 15. 
298
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 65.4.    
299USTR Special 301 Report  for 2004, supra note 295, at 15. 
300USTR Special 301 Report  for 2004, supra note 295, at 15. 
301SPECIAL 301 REPORT, USTR, 2005, available at:  
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Special_301/asset_uplo
ad_file195_7636.pdf (last visited Sept.18, 2007), at 27. 
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the Ministry of Health and the Patent before granting marketing approvals for 
pharmaceuticals.
302
 The U.S. was still dissatisfied with enforcement in other fields of 
copyrights like software and books.
303
 However, improvements in copyright 
enforcement for musical works were noted.
304
 
The 2006 report repeated most of the contents of its predecessor.
305
 This 
repetition included complaints about protection of test data and enforcement of 
copyrights. Egypt remained on the "Priority Watch List".
306
 Some positive changes 
like the issuance of the Executive Regulations for Copyrights and the Law of 
Importation and Exportation covering border measures for IPR, were noted.
307
 The 
latter Law closed a serious loophole in the Egyptian legal system that had not 
provided for border measures as required by the TRIPS. Such improvements were still 
insufficient, thus the U.S. began to demand more explicitly the application of TRIPS 
Plus like the accession to the WIPO Internet Treaties.
308
 Such Treaties provide TRIPS 
Plus measures for the protection of copyrights on the internet.    
Finally, the 2007 Report continued Egypt's status on the "Priority Watch 
List".
309
 This report of 2007 provides insight into the U.S. judgment of the current 
state of the IPR protection in Egypt. The only difference from the preceding reports 
was the addition of a request for Egypt to apply border measures to goods in transit.
310
 
This TRIPS Plus request is a common denominator in all of the U.S. FTAs. The U.S. 
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USTR Special 301 Report  for 2006, supra note 305, at 28.     
308USTR Special 301 Report  for 2006, supra note 305, at 28.         
309SPECIAL 301 REPORT, USTR, 2007, available at: 
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was probably encouraged by the issuance of the Egyptian border measure regulations 
through a ministerial decree (Minister of trade and Industry). Further amendments of 
the Regulations are easy to make as they fall under the competency of a minister. 
Thus, the complexities of presenting the amendments required by the USTR to the 
Egyptian Parliament (The People's Assembly) could be avoided. 
 b. USTR National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers
311
 
This annual report is more comprehensive than the Section 301 Report. Those 
NTE reports issued prior to 2003, focused on the pending IPR Law.
312
 Those early 
reports were critical about the delay in the issuance of the Law, in addition to other 
procedural issues concerning patents, trademarks and undisclosed information. Since 
2003, the NTE comments were directed at the newly issued IPR Law. The 2003 report 
claimed that Egypt's new Law did not comply with its commitments under the TRIPS 
to protect "confidential test data".
313
 The Section 301 report remarks that Egypt 
granted marketing approvals for generic versions of patented U.S. pharmaceuticals 
were reiterated.
314
 The U.S. once again refused to acknowledge the fact that Egypt 
was not obliged at that point to grant patents for final products of pharmaceuticals. 
The Report also included U.S. complaints about enforcement in the area of 
copyright.
315
 Similar complaints existed for trademarks and industrial designs.
316
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The 2004 NTE Report included similar comments. But it altered its approach 
to strategic criticism of test data protection. It claimed that Egypt violates its own laws 
concerning data exclusivity.
317
 The fact is that the Egyptian Law does not refer to the 
terminology of data exclusivity. The Law rather adopts the same concept of the TRIPS 
Agreement of the protection of undisclosed information.
318
  
The 2005 Report emphasized the worsening situation for the protection of test 
data.
319
 It also introduced new comments concerning the protection of new plant 
varieties.
320
 The U.S. accused the Ministry of Agriculture of being unable to register 
any new plant variety till December 2004, due to the onerous procedures required by 
the IPR Law.
321
 The biggest procedural concern was the requirement that the applicant 
must deposit a sample of its new variety with the Egyptian Bank of Genes.
322
 This 
requirement is accompanied by the disclosure of the genetic resources or traditional 
knowledge associated with this new variety.
323
 The U.S. breeders have been refraining 
from exporting their new varieties to Egypt because of such concerns, fearing that 
their breeds would be exposed to piracy.
324
  
The granting of marketing approval of generic drugs continued in Egypt.
325
 
The 2006 Report added new dimensions to previous U.S. complaints about the 
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protection of test data.
326
 The new element was that some of the approvals affected 
pending patent applications filed with the Egyptian Patent Office.
327
 This problem was 
aggravated by the prolonged patent approval procedures.
328
 An interim alternative to 
patents is exclusive marketing rights provided by both the TRIPS and the Egyptian 
Law.
329
 A U.S. pharmaceutical company was denied such exclusive marketing rights 
by an Egyptian court.
330
 The Report raised more comments about the substance of the 
Law itself rather than its implementation.
331
 It mentioned that the Law does not 
provide for the exclusive commercial rights conferred to trademarks owners according 
to the TRIPS.
332
 The Law only referred to these rights in the context of the exhaustion 
of trademarks rights.
333
 This is a peculiar type of legal drafting of denying or 
terminating rights that were never stipulated by the Law. Other concerns were raised 
in the Report about the absence of the additional level of geographical indications 
protection granted by the TRIPS to wines and spirits.
334
 The only level that is 
provided by the Law is the initial level, which protects the GIs to the extent that the 
public is not misled about the true origin of the good.
335
 The 2007 Report was almost 
the same as its predecessor.
336
  
                                                                                    
                                                
3262006 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 2006, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_NTE_Report/asset_upl
oad_file102_9241.pdf (last visited Dec.5, 2007), at 210. 
327Id.    
328USTR NTE Report for 2006, supra note 326, at 210. 
329USTR NTE Report for 2006, supra note 326, at 210. 
330USTR NTE Report for 2006, supra note 326, at 210. 
331USTR NTE Report for 2006, supra note 326, at 210. 
332USTR NTE Report for 2006, supra note 326, at 210. & TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 
16.1.    
333The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 71& TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 16.1.  
334USTR NTE Report for 2006, supra note 326, at 210, The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 
280, at Articles 104 -114 & TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 23.  
335USTR NTE Report for 2006, supra note 326, at 210, The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 
280, at Articles 104 -114 & TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 23.  
3362007 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 2007, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_NTE_Report/asset_upl
oad_file846_10941.pdf (last visited Dec.5, 2007).    
 56 
2. The IIPA Annual Reports 
The IIPA reports help inform about of the USTR judgment of IPR protection 
in various countries. The 2003 IIPA Report included direct criticism of the Egyptian 
IPR Law
337
. Later reports just reiterated the basic content of that of in 2003 Report.
338
 
For example, the Report stated that the criminal penalties for copyright infringements 
are derived from those stipulated by the former copyright law of 1954.
339
 The 
penalties in the Law range from 5000 to 10000 L.E. and/or a minimum period of 
imprisonment of one month.
340
 This penalty lags behind the TRIPS objective of 
criminal remedies to provide deterrence to IPR violations.
341
 The fines should be 
proportionate to the size of business involved, while the fixed financial penalties of 
the Law only put a ceiling on the damage inflicted by the infringer.
342
 
The Law also enables the judicial authorities to seize materials that are fully 
assigned to the act of copyright infringement.
343
 This requirement contradicts the 
TRIPS which requires the seizure of the implements and materials that are 
predominantly used in infringement.
344
 The Law allows judicial authorities to order a 
custodian to make use of the disputed copyrighted works, with revenues deposited at 
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the court till the case is judicially decided.
345
 This provision contradicts the TRIPS 
obligation that the seized products shall be disposed outside of the market.
346
  
The right of translation into Arabic lapses under the Law if the copyright 
owner doesn't make within three years from the date of publication.
347
 Egypt has no 
right to make this exception to the right of translation under the Berne Convention 
since it didn't fulfill the requirement of notifying the WIPO first.
348
 The limited 
exceptions to copyrights under the Law don't provide for the three step conditions 
stated in the TRIPS.
349
 The three conditions were only stated in the Law for one 
particular exception to copyrights, making a personal copy.
350
 The conditions should 
have been located at the "Chapeau" of the whole provision covering these limited 
exceptions.
351
 The interests of the copyright owner could thus be jeopardized by a 
broad interpretation of the Law by the courts which might approve seriously 
infringing acts.
352
 
The Law also enables broadcasting organizations to broadcast publicly 
performed works as long as an adequate remuneration is paid to the author.
353
 This 
payment could be "in cash or in kind".
354
 IIPA requests that "this provision provides a 
compulsory license and should be deleted".
355
 Another peculiar aspect of this 
provision of the Law is that it doesn’t refer to an equivalent remuneration to be paid to 
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the performers.
356
 This is despite the fact that the Law refers to other types of 
remunerations that should be also paid if necessary.
357
 A better wording in the Law 
would have referred directly to the performers' remunerations.
358
  
C. Criticism Raised by the U.S. against Egypt in the WTO Trade Policy Review 
 WTO members are subject to periodic reviews of their trade policies in all 
economic fields including IPR. Such reviews are carried out by the WTO Secretariat 
under the "Trade Policy Review Mechanism".
359
 A different time frequency for the 
reviews is assigned for each of the WTO members according to its share in 
international trade.
360
 For Egypt, this review takes place every six years.
361
 Part of this 
review takes the form of an exchange of questions and replies between Egypt and its 
main trading partners.
362
  
Certainly, all questions pertaining to IPR in the trade policy review are posed 
by developed countries like the U.S. The particular importance of examining the 
questions raised by the U.S. is that they give indications about its areas of concern 
about IPR protection in Egypt. The U.S. raised IPR questions in the Trade Policy 
Review of Egypt, which cover the same issues raised at the bilateral level.
363
 The 
repeated questions included areas of data exclusivity, exceptions of copyrights, rights 
conferred by trademarks, and enforcement of IPR.
364
 The only additional question was 
about the exceptions of patentability under the Egyptian IPR Law.
365
 The U.S. was 
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concerned about the exception of "organs, tissues, viable cells and DNA" from 
patentability.
366
 Egypt replied that these areas are interrelated with the areas exempted 
from patentability under the TRIPS, like plants and animals.
367
 The Egyptian 
argument was that if the whole animal or plant is exempted, then its cells are subject 
to the same rule.
368
 Moreover, Egypt referred to other ethical and religious factors 
preventing the grant of patents to these areas.
369
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IV. A comparison of Egypt's IPR Law with IPR Standards in the U.S. 
FTAs  
 
The critical point of this thesis is a comparison of the Egyptian IPR Law with 
the U.S. FTAs. There are many divergences in the different U.S. FTAs terms with 
different countries regarding substantive standards and language. Still, it is possible to 
compare the common denominators.  
However, one must decide whether the comparison should be made between 
the Egyptian IP Law and the U.S. FTAs with low or high TRIPS Plus standards. The 
specific FTAs terms that will be the appropriate point for comparison are unknown till 
the negotiations are launched between Egypt and the U.S. The start of negotiations 
will reveal the significant interests motivating the two countries. A general trade 
negotiation rule is that later negotiated agreements are more difficult for the weaker 
party. This is obvious from all WTO accessions in all international trade files 
including IPR. Accordingly, the U.S. is more likely to request high IPR standards in 
the FTA negotiations with Egypt.                
The focus of this comparison of the US FTAs is with countries sharing 
common economic conditions with Egypt. Levels of economic status vary widely 
among developing countries. Guiding factors for the similarity of economic conditions 
of a given country and Egypt might include population, income per capita and 
unemployment rate. The more socially vulnerable a country is, the less it is able to 
accept TRIP Plus provisions. This rule applies despite all counter arguments 
suggesting that adequate and effective IPR protection is a prerequisite to investment 
promotion and economic growth.  
The US FTA with Morocco furnishes a good platform for comparison. 
Morocco like Egypt has a relatively large population, with World Bank country data 
for the year 2005 indicating the Moroccan population to be 30.2 million compared to 
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74 in Egypt.
370
 GNI per capita in 2005 was 1730 annually for Morocco and 1250 for 
Egypt.
371
 The closeness of the GNI figures indicates Egypt's potential to accept the 
TRIPS Plus measures. Moreover, the Morocco FTA would be likely to be used by the 
US as a template since it has been used almost exactly in other FTAs with countries 
such as Bahrain and Oman. 
A. Gaps in IPR Standards between the U.S. FTAs and the Egyptian IPR Law 
1. Trademarks 
a. Eligibility for Registration    
The FTAs require more legal levels regarding trademarks distinctiveness than 
the visual perception criterion that is stipulated by the TRIPS.
372
 FTA parties are 
obliged to approve registration of peculiar types of trademarks like sound and smell of 
the mark.
373
 The TRIPS is flexible enough in this regard as it is optional for members 
to choose whether to apply the visual perception criterion as prerequisite for 
trademark registration or not.
374
 TRIPS gives WTO members the option of requiring 
the registration of trademarks to be contingent upon use or not.
375
 In fact, the current 
Egyptian Law makes use of the TRIPS. In defining trademarks, the Law lists a 
number of examples such as names, colors and numbers or combinations thereof.
376
 
The definition is succeeded by a condition that all types of trademarks must be 
visually perceptive.
377
 The Law also links ownership of trademarks to use within five 
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years from the registration date.
378
 Otherwise, competent courts are entitled to cancel 
the registration upon the request of any interested party.
379
 The owner may still 
request the restoration of this cancelled registration within three years in exchange for 
an additional formality and according to the same requirements of the initial 
registration.
380
 Restoration is always feasible unless the cancellation is the outcome of 
a judicial decision.
381
  
b. Rights Conferred to Trademarks Owners 
 The FTAs extended rights conferred to trademark owners under the TRIPS. 
The TRIPS grants such rights with respect to identical or similar signs for identical or 
similar goods or services.
382
 The FTAs oblige their parties to apply the trademark 
classifications of the WIPO Nice Agreement.
383
 These classifications prescribed by 
the Nice Agreement put trademarks assigning different goods or services into 
interrelated groupings. However, the FTAs extend trademark rights to "related goods 
or services", which is beyond the Nice classifications.
384
 This extension reverses the 
objectives of the Agreement as the registration of a trademark for one or more 
classifications will be automatically extended to neighboring classifications. Egypt is 
already a member of the Nice Agreement
385
. The current practice in Egypt is that the 
registration is only approved for classifications specified in the applications.   
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c. Intersection between Trademarks and Geographical Indications   
The U.S. FTAs favor trademarks over geographical indications. In other 
words, the intersectional relationship between trademarks and geographical 
indications is transformed by the FTAs to an interchangeable one, in favor of the 
former. This has been the consistent U.S. position in all international trade forums. In 
WTO negotiations, the U.S. always opposes the E.C.'s attempts to upgrade the current 
international level of GIs protection. The FTAs give trademark owners exclusive 
rights preventing all third parties from commercially using their marks without their 
consent.
386
 In the abstract, this condition is nothing more than what is already required 
by the TRIPS.
387
 The prevalence of trademarks over GIs is only acknowledged by the 
TRIPS in one of two cases: use prior to the TRIPS or lack of protection of the GI in 
question in its country of origin.
388
 The only difference is that under the FTAs, the use 
of GIs is subject to prevention by trademarks owners of similar or identical 
products.
389
  
Further, the FTAs are clear in exempting the common name from the 
protection of GIs.
390
 The TRIPS avails WTO members of the possibility of exempting 
customary names from GIs protection, which is the U.S. approach.
391
 To the contrary, 
proponents of GIs usually choose to apply GIs to such customary names.
392
 Many 
parties to FTAs belong to the so - called Old World. The element of accumulation of 
the marketing reputation of a given good is necessary for a GI to develop in any 
territory; this is only enjoyable by Old World countries. Rich biodiversity in a given 
country along with the presence of large indigenous communities such as those in 
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Morocco are important elements that makes GIs more advantageous than trademarks. 
The FTAs thus deprives Morocco of the advantages of its heritage which contributes 
to its economic strength and well being.     
New World countries such as the U.S., Canada and Australia, care less for the 
protection of GIs. Accordingly, the U.S. FTAs deprive their Old World partners from 
pursuing internal protection for their own customary names under the GIs system
393
. 
In addition, the definition of GIs under the TRIPS refers only to goods
394
. Interested 
members can choose to apply GIs to services as well
395
. The U.S. FTAs are specific in 
including GIs for services
396
. This inclusion of services provides trademark owners 
with further advantages, thus promoting the U.S. FTAs' approach which favors 
trademarks for all types of GIs, whether goods or services. The Egyptian Law is 
deficient in GI provisions and its definition of GIs doesn't include services anyway, 
therefore this point is irrelevant
397
.  
d. E – Filing for Trademarks 
E - filing is the most challenging TRIPS Plus requirement in the U.S. FTAs 
regarding trademarks, as it requires advanced facilities often unavailable in 
developing countries.
398
The FTAs mandate that their parties establish an e-filing 
system for trademarks.
 399
 This system includes application, registration, opposition 
and renewing of the trademarks.
400
 In tandem, an online database is to be available to 
the public presenting applications and registrations of trademarks submitted to the 
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competent authorities.
401
 This substantive requirement is already in place in Egypt 
with the Commercial Registry thus satisfying the U.S. standards.  
e. Recordation of Trademarks Licenses 
The TRIPS grants WTO members the right to regulate licensing and 
assignment of trademarks, as long as compulsory licenses are not involved.
402
 In 
contrast, the U.S. FTAs deny registration of trademark licenses as a prerequisite of 
their legal validity.
403
 The Egyptian IPR Law requires, through elaborate provisions, 
that all trademarks licenses be registered or else they will not be recognized.
404
  
This registration requirement of the Egyptian IPR Law is included in its 
Executive Regulations listing all data related to the licensing process. The registration 
data includes all the information about the licenser and licensee.
405
 The licenses are 
non assignable except with consent of the owner.
406
 To this end, all the signatures 
included in the licensing contracts need first to be judicially certified.
407
 Registrability 
can't be satisfied by registration of the licensing act itself. The registration must also 
include an authentic copy of the contract.
408
  
Like all trademarks legal transactions, registration must be published for 
transparency reasons.
409
 The calculation of all terms of IPR protection commences 
from the publication date.
410
 The same publication requirement is mandatory for all 
legal transactions. Accordingly, the legal effects of licensing contracts of trademarks 
are in suspension till their publication.
411
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2. Geographical Indications 
Countries adopt numerous individual approaches to the TRIPS definition of 
GIs thus making it one of the most controversial IPR issues, since GIs are interrelated 
with other concepts such as appellations of origin and false indications of sources. The 
differences among these concepts are ill defined. That's why the U.S. FTAs do not 
include extensive GIs provisions. The FTAs instead reiterate what is already 
mentioned in their trademarks sections about the prevalence of trademarks over GIs 
where conflict occurs. Additionally, the FTAs extend the GIs definition under the 
TRIPS to include elements that are classically designated for identifying or defining 
trademarks.
412
 For instance, the FTAs definition of GIs states that "any sign or 
combination of signs including geographical and personal names shall be eligible to 
be a geographical indication".
413
 Purportedly, this definition expands the scope of GIs, 
but in reality, it strengthens the reach of trademark owners over GIs. As a practical 
matter, this definition makes trademarks eligible for all privileges currently enjoyable 
by GIs under the TRIPS while the converse is not true.                                        
3. Copyright and Related Rights 
a. Exclusive Rights of Reproduction 
The U.S. FTAs grant holders of copyright and related rights the exclusive 
rights to prevent all third parties from any sort of reproduction of protected works.
414
 
This prevention includes the act of making temporary copies in electronic forms 
without the holder's consent.
415
 No specifications for computer programs are 
mentioned in the FTAs.
416
 Accordingly, the prevention clause extends to all types of 
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reproductions.
417
 The Egyptian IPR Law, in turn, endorses a vast array of exceptions 
that are frequently criticized by the U.S. Such exceptions include the making of single 
and personal copies for some forms of literary or artistic works.
418
 Temporary copies 
of computer programs are also exempted by the Law, as long as they are being carried 
out by a legal possessor.
419
  
b. Exhaustion of Rights 
Exhaustion of exclusive rights is usually included in developing countries' IPR 
laws in order to offer the public alternative channels of distribution of copyrighted 
works. The TRIPS is neutral with respect to exhaustion of IPR rights. It explicitly 
mentions that its provisions do not prevent WTO members from the right to apply 
exhaustion.
420
 This exhaustion may take place outside the territory of the member, 
when the copyright owner transfers this right abroad. It is then presumed that the 
original copies of this work are possessed legitimately abroad unless otherwise is 
established by the owner. This owner can, in case of copyright infringement, request 
the competent authorities to apply border measures to imported products. The FTAs 
extend the exclusive rights of the copyright holders, by preventing the FTAs parties 
from applying exhaustion to imports. In contrast, exhaustion is repeated in all sections 
of the Egyptian Law including for copyright.
421
  
c. Term of Protection 
Extension of the term of copyright protection as prescribed by the TRIPS is a 
common factor in most FTAs. This term is extended from 50 to 70 years computed 
from the author's death.
422
 This extension applies to all forms of copyright 
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indiscriminately, including works of applied arts.
423
 The protection of such applied 
arts is limited by the Egyptian Law to 25 years from the date of publication or public 
availability, whichever comes last.
424
 The FTAs apply the same extension of the term 
of protection to performers and producers of phonograms.
425
 
4. Patents 
a. Scope of Patentability 
Patent is one of the key IPR fields. The FTAs require higher levels of 
protection than those provided by the TRIPS. The TRIPS offers WTO members some 
optional exceptions from patentability in some sensitive fields of technology, or ordre 
public concerns.
426
 The FTAs maintained only the latter exceptions.
427
 Exceptions 
from patentability are restricted by the FTAs to "protect the ordre public or morality, 
including human, animal, or plant life or health, or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment".
428
 This exception is unavoidable even by the most zealous IPR 
demandeurs like the U.S.
429
 This area of exceptions is a matter of serious sensitivity 
aligning most developing countries in their concerns about boundaries for 
patentability.  
The same is not true for other areas acknowledged by the TRIPS to be 
sensitive, with patentability left to the choice of each member.
430
 The FTAs are silent 
about excluding these areas like "diagnostic, therapeutic or surgical methods for 
humans or animals" from patentability.
431
 Accordingly, parties of the FTAs are 
obliged to offer patents in these areas and to cease availing themselves of the TRIPS 
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options in this regard.
432
 The FTAs explicitly extend this patent obligation to even 
more controversial areas like plants and animals.
433
          
b. Limitations to Patent Rights 
The FTAs provide that the patent owner has exclusive rights that are unlimited 
by the principle of exhaustion.
434
 In this context, the FTAs state that those rights, in 
particular with respect to importation, are not impaired by the act of selling the 
patented product abroad by the patent owner.
435
 Importation of the patented products 
by third parties would thus always require the consent of the owner.
436
 The Egyptian 
Law has made use of exhaustion as granted by the TRIPS to WTO members.
437
 The 
Law states that "the owner's right to prevent third parties from importing, using, 
selling or distributing a product shall lapse when he commercializes the product in any 
country or authorizes a third party to do so".
438
  
c. Term of Patent Protection 
Patents is one of the most frequent fields for imposing TRIPS Plus measures in 
the FTAs. The TRIPS provides only a term of patent protection of twenty years 
computed from the filing date.
439
 FTAs negotiators have not managed to increase the 
term of protection in normal circumstances. Instead, if an unreasonable delay occurs 
in the process of patent application, the FTAs grant the owner a compensatory term of 
protection.
440
 The owner is only entitled to this compensation if the delay is not his 
fault. For instance, the right holder has no privilege to this compensatory term if the 
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cause of delay is unfurnished documentation from his side.
441
 The FTAs define this 
delay to be a period of "more than four years from the filing date or two years from 
the request of examination of the application, whichever, lasts longer".
442
 This 
compensation shall only be equal to the delay period.
443
 For example, if the 
application inspection takes five years from the filing date, the patent owner is 
compensated for one year, making the overall net patent duration equal to sixteen 
years. Moreover, the compensation is contingent on the request of an interested party, 
like the patent owner.
444
 Thus, the competent authorities are not burdened by an ex 
officio obligation under the FTAs to adjust the term of protection for the delays.
445
       
The Egyptian Law, in contrast, does not include any such time compensation. 
The interested party has only an opportunity to resort to the competent administrative 
court to complain about unreasonably prolonged inspections of his patent application. 
However, having the Law void of specific provisions about the time compensation 
leaves the whole matter to the power of decision of the judge. This is disadvantageous 
to the applicant because the Egyptian judge will seldom decide against an over - 
burdened government authority like the Patent Office. 
5. Measures Related to Certain Products 
a. Data Exclusivity versus Undisclosed Information  
This is the most controversial IPR issue and a serious hindrance to Egypt's 
eligibility to join an FTA with the U.S. As previously noted in chapter 3, the U.S. 
criticism of the IPR protection in Egypt centers on this issue. In fact, the FTAs' 
provisions are drafted in a manner that avoids provoking the public opinion in 
developing countries towards data exclusivity. The real heading of this part in the 
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FTAs should have been the protection of data exclusivity. However, data exclusivity 
is disguised in the FTAs under the heading "Measures Related to Certain Products".
446
 
The vague wording of this heading in the FTAs does not really specify its scope of 
application. This scope would have to be inferred from the context of the underlying 
provisions, as the straightforward definition of the "certain products" is not provided 
by the FTAs. The kind of protection offered or even the exact field of IPR under 
which this part falls is deliberately avoided by the FTAs. Normally, international IPR 
legal texts provide a specified terminology for any form of IPR they tackle. The 
TRIPS calls this form of IPR "undisclosed information", while the U.S. legal system 
and its reports use the term "data exclusivity". The Egyptian IPR Law adopts the term 
undisclosed information and almost copycats its definition from the TRIPS.
447
 
b. Rights Conferred by Data Exclusivity   
The right conferred to owners of test data is the most controversial aspect of 
data exclusivity. The FTAs grant applicants exclusivity of reference to their test data 
in the course of marketing approval for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals.
448
 
In other words, the owners are treated as first come first protected. A person must 
submit such data upon request of the competent authority as a condition for getting the 
marketing approval of his pharmaceutical product. Consequently, data exclusivity 
gives him the right to prevent third parties from referring to his data to get their own 
marketing approvals.
449
 This right also works even if such data is not confidential, or 
is being published in publicly available official documents or websites.  In this case, 
third parties are obliged to submit their own data to get marketing approval. This data 
is inspected for its efficacy and safety apart from the inspection that has already been 
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carried out by the competent authority for the data submitted by the original person. 
The net result of this process is redundancy in administrative costs and efforts, and 
prolongation of time for approval for submitted data. All extra costs would be levied 
on the third parties, who in turn, pass the costs on to the consumers. In some cases, 
third parties' competitiveness is hampered by the additional time period for the new 
inspections, and thus reducing product option for consumers.  
The Egyptian Law has been decisive in preventing this redundancy of 
procedures or costs of marketing approvals for pharmaceuticals.
450
 It adopts the 
conditions of the secrecy of data as provided for by the TRIPS.
451
 Accordingly, if the 
submitted data is publicly available, no exclusivity is granted to the initial 
submitter.
452
 The FTAs are clear that exclusivity also applies to documents proving 
marketing approval abroad.
453
 The strict application of undisclosed information is a 
significant point of free riding for third parties marketing approval for 
pharmaceuticals in Egypt. To elaborate, if the U.S. Food and Drug Administration or 
any other credible entity in a developed country approves a certain drug, the Egyptian 
Ministry of Health would probably accept the circulation of this drug in the Egyptian 
market. The outcome of this procedural flexibility is enjoyed equally by both the 
initial submitter and third parties. They are both exempted from some documentation 
requirements.                                   
c. Term of Protection 
The term of protection is specified by the FTAs, making use of the TRIPS 
silence this regard
454
. The term under the FTAs is five years for pharmaceuticals and 
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ten years for agricultural chemicals, computed from the approval date.
455
 This 
computation trigger under the FTAs assures that the long administrative procedures do 
not affect the rights holders.
456
 The TRIPS does not include any provisions regulating 
this computation process either.
457
 
The Egyptian Law literally abides by the wording of the TRIPS on this issue to 
comply with Egypt's international obligations without applying any TRIPS Plus 
measures. In other areas where the TRIPS is not specific, like the term of protection, 
the Law adopts a lower standard compared to the level of protection offered by the 
FTAs. The Law provides five years of protection of undisclosed information 
regardless, whether such data belong to pharmaceuticals or agricultural chemicals.
458
 
Computation starts from the date of submission or till such data are disclosed, 
whichever comes first.
459
  
The FTAs also provide for a compensatory period to the duration of the patent 
in the case of unreasonable curtailment resulting from the marketing approval 
process.
460
 However, there is no FTA definition of unreasonable curtailment or any 
time limits for the competent authority to decide on marketing approval 
applications.
461
 In practice, this time compensation is useless if the marketing 
approval takes less time than that taken for patent approval.
462
 In this case, the owner 
of the test data will be granted the time compensation already determined by the FTAs 
for the curtailment in patent procedures. A problem still exists if there is no such 
patent curtailment, as it will be difficult to compute time compensation due to the 
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curtailment in the marketing approval procedures because of the lack of the FTA 
definition. The Egyptian Law, as in the case for patent procedures, does not provide 
for any time compensation of any kind.
463
 
d. Linking Marketing Approval to Patents  
The FTAs include provisions linking marketing approval to existing patents.
464
 
The absence of this link in Egypt is one of the frequent points of U.S. criticism against 
IP protection in Egypt. This link should be made if a patent is still in force for the 
same product that is the subject matter of a marketing approval application.
465
 The 
FTAs require that the competent authority prevent the applicant from marketing the 
product till the patent lapses.
466
 Alternatively, an FTA party may allow for the 
application of such marketing approvals, but the patent owner must be notified of the 
applicant's identity.
467
  
The Egyptian Law provides for measures that are not necessarily contradictory 
to the wording of the FTAs but still are not fully compatible with their spirit. The 
FTAs aim at limiting the practice of "the Bolar exemption". This practice allows third 
parties to prepare for marketing approval for the patented product within the patent 
duration, but the marketing itself should not start until after the protection expires.
468
 
The FTAs might also be targeting, without explicitly stating, the application of extra - 
territorial jurisdiction for patents registered in the U.S. This is absolutely out of the 
question under the Egyptian Law which only recognizes patents registered in the 
Egyptian Patent Office.
469
 
 
                                                
463The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, Article 56.   
464
U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note372, Article 15.10.4.   
465U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note372, Article 15.10.4 
466U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note372, Article 15.10.4 
467U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note372, Article 15.10.4 
468The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, Article 10.5.  
469The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 5.    
 75 
6. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
a. Enforcement of Copyright  
The FTAs obligate their parties to apply enforcement measures to copyrights 
and related rights regardless of their registration with the competent authorities.
470
 The 
entitlement to copyright or related right could thus be proven by any available 
evidence, like the direct designation of the right holder's name on the product.
471
 Other 
sorts of evidence like licensing contracts could also be sufficient for the right holder to 
be able to claim the right to protection for enforcement measures. In contrast, the 
Egyptian Law requires the holders of copyrights and related rights to register their 
products with the competent authorities. For all types of copyrights, the competent 
authority is the Egyptian Ministry of the Culture, while the Ministry of Telecom is 
responsible for computer programs and data bases.
472
 The Ministry of Media is only 
responsible for the protection of broadcast organizations.
473
 
b. Compensation under Civil Remedies 
 The FTAs adopt a system of damage calculation that is completely derived 
from a U.S. legal system and that cannot be fitted to the Egyptian Civil law. Profits 
gained by the infringer are considered by the FTAs in determining the amount of the 
compensation.
474
 This profit consideration must occur for infringements of trademarks 
and, copyrights and related rights.
475
 Those fields of IPR must also be protected by pre 
- established damages.
476
 In case of patents, judicial authorities are authorized to raise 
the amount of the compensation to at least triple the damage.
477
 This damage may be 
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either proven or just assessed.
478
 The damages must also include the retail value of the 
product assigned to the infringed IPR.
479
 The consideration of both the profits and 
retail values will lead to the duplication of the calculation process. Damages to be paid 
by the infringer will thus be maximized, leading to stronger deterrence.   
The Egyptian Legal system has not gone as far as the FTAs in punishing the 
infringer. The amount payable in Egyptian IPR cases must be in harmony with other 
violations of the law. The Egyptian IPR law provides for very few provisions of civil 
remedies leaving the whole matter to the Civil Law. Obviously, the IPR Law 
provisions in this regard are complementary to the remedies provided by the latter 
Law.
480
 The most important contribution of the IPR Law to the civil remedies is that it 
allows the judge to order the sale of goods infringing trademarks.
481
 Civil remedies for 
other forms of IPR infringement are not clear from the IPR Law. The revenue from 
the selling process is not necessarily given to the right holder as a direct 
compensation.
482
 Rather, this revenue will only cover all fines and compensations.
483
 
The principal amount of compensation ordered for the right holder under the civil 
filing shall not be deemed to be subject to an increase generated by this revenue.  
The Civil Law specifies the general principle for damage computation.
484
 This 
principle adopts the right holder's interest as the standpoint for computing the 
damages.
485
 The process of determination of the exact amount of the compensation is 
left to the discretion of the judge.
486
 The only guiding principle for the Egyptian judge 
under the Civil Law is to take into consideration two factors: the damages and the 
                                                
478U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372,at Article 15.11.7.    
479U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372,at Article 15.11.6(b).  
480The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 117.   
481
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 117.   
482The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 117.   
483The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 117.   
484The Egyptian Civil Law, Law no 131 for the Year 1948, at Article 221,1.  
485The Egyptian Civil Law, Law no 131 for the Year 1948, at Article 221,1. 
486The Egyptian Civil Law, Law no 131 for the Year 1948, at Article 221,1. 
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profit opportunity lost by the right holder.
487
 It is worth mentioning that the holder's 
loss usually exceeds the profits taken by the infringer, because the whole rationale of 
infringement in Egypt is to offer the public cheaper prices and lower quality. Egyptian 
consumers tend to be more price than quality sensitive. The same applies in 
considering the retail value of the product bearing the infringing IPR. It is usually but 
not always, very cheap.                                               
c. Destruction of Seized Goods 
The FTAs limit the TRIPS options for dealing with seized goods to the act of 
destruction.
488
 This destruction is to take place without compensation of any sort in 
accordance with the TRIPS instructions.
489
 Other options provided by the TRIPS such 
as the confiscation and disposal of the infringing goods outside the channels of 
commerce are provided by the FTAs only ambiguously.
490
 These other options are 
only permitted by the FTAs under exceptional circumstances.
491
 The FTAs provide 
only for the option of confiscation of materials and implements used in the course of 
infringement.
492
 The trademarks provisions in Egyptian IPR Law make use of all the 
TRIPS Options for both the goods and associated materials and implements.
493
 This 
Egyptian system of confiscation is likely to be given more international consideration. 
The act of destruction of goods bearing infringing trademarks has unpleasant 
environmental costs that are not recognized as generally affordable. The copyright 
provisions in the Law are less explicit as they only refer to confiscation.
494
 Recycling 
of copyright infringing goods is less likely, as the removal of the infringement is not 
practically feasible in most cases.       
                                                
487The Egyptian Civil Law, Law no 131 for the Year 1948, at Article 221,1. 
488U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.11.10.  
489
U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.11.10. 
490U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.11.10. 
491U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.11.10. 
492U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.11.10. 
493The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Articles 117.    
494The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 181.     
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d. Border Measures 
Border measures are one of the most common issues in any TRIPS Plus text, 
as they provide for an enforcement efficiency that is not attainable in the domestic 
market where infringing goods may be widely dispersed. The TRIPS offers a wide 
range of options with respect to the scope of application of such border measures.
495
 
The FTAs require that border measures be applied either by the request of an 
interested party or ex officio by the competent authorities.
496
 A security is to be paid 
by the applicant for the application of such border measures.
497
 However, this security 
shall not be burdensome to the extent that would "deter the right holders from 
resorting to border measures".
498
 The measures are also applicable under the FTAs to 
"importation, exportation and goods in transit".
499
  
The Egyptian IPR Law is silent about the border measures, a matter of harsh 
criticism by Egypt's trading partners from the developed world. However, in 2005, 
Egypt endorsed border measures in the Executive Regulations for the Law of 
Importation and Exportation, the Law no 118 for the Year 1975.
500
 These Regulations 
give the government great flexibility in deciding on the level of enforcement measures 
applied at Egyptian borders. They are issued and amendable by a decree of the 
Minister of Trade and Industry. The issuance of the Regulations relieved the concerns 
of other countries like the U.S. about IPR enforcement in Egypt.  
The current Egyptian Regulations fall short of the level presented by the FTAs. 
For instance, Egypt does not apply border measures for exportation and transit, so as 
                                                
495TRIPS, supra note 2, at Articles 51 – 60.  
496
U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Articles 15.11.20 & 15.11.23.  
497U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.11.21.   
498U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.11.21 
499U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.11.23.   
500The Egyptian Law of Importation and Exportation, the Law no 118 for the Year 1975, 
available at: http://www.customs.gov.eg/LAW/menu.html (last visited April 1, 2008).       
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not to burden its competent authorities with non mandatory measures.
501
 Ex Officio 
application is also limited to receipt of a notification from other governmental 
agency.
502
 This notification is to be proceeded by a complaint filed by the interested 
party, after being promptly notified by the competent customs about the ex officio 
procedures.
503
 In contrast, Egypt applies border measures to a wider range of IPR 
forms than that required by the FTAs. It applies the measures to patents, layout 
designs for integrated circuits and industrial designs, while the FTAs only cover 
trademarks and, copyrights and related rights.
504
 However, this detailing in the 
Egyptian Regulations is of little practical value. All the additional IPR forms in the 
Egyptian Regulations, except the industrial designs, require laboratory inspection that 
is not available for the customs facilities. A border complaint for a patent violation is 
to be diverted to the Patent Office, where it will be moved through a long procedure 
for decision making. The U.S. will thus be less interested in this addition by Egypt, 
favoring the application of its FTAs standards.                                                    
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
501Id, Executive Regulations, at Article 27.  
502
Law of Importation and Exportation, , Executive Regulations, at supra note 500, at Article 
31.   
503Law of Importation and Exportation, , Executive Regulations, at supra note 500, at Articles 
27-28 & 33.  
504Law of Importation and Exportation, , Executive Regulations, at supra note 500, at Article 
27.  
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V. Policy Concerns and Conclusions       
A. Policy Concerns Regarding Elevating the IPR Protection Standards to Those 
Endorsed by the U.S. FTAs 
 
1. Overview 
This chapter examines policy concerns that would currently prevent Egypt 
from accepting TRIPS Plus provisions. Chapter 4 served to highlight the legal 
differences between the TRIPS Plus provisions in the U.S. FTAs and the Egyptian 
IPR Law. However, policy issues preventing Egypt's adoption of the TRIPS Plus 
aren't necessarily evident from the legal comparison. A country formulates its policy 
first then it promulgates the implementing law. Countries go into international trade 
negotiations with policy priorities. Some of the points they hope to keep non 
negotiable while some other areas are open for tradeoffs. A country might be 
successful in accomplishing all of its policy priorities or it could lose some of them in 
the course of negotiations. The key question remains: which compromises would be 
problematic for the vital areas of policy of a country?  
The level of development in a given country will define its areas of sensitivity. 
Those areas need to be protected from any substantive compromises. For a developing 
country, sensitivity problems will emanate from concerns for social and economic 
vulnerability. These problems are usually shared by countries at the similar levels of 
development. Reports issued by international organizations, such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO), address TRIPS Plus in general and possible policy problems for 
the protection of public health in developing countries
505
. If a specific country is 
mentioned in a WHO report, the conclusion usually applies to other developing 
countries as well. For a developed country, industry lobbying pressures might prohibit 
                                                
505Hereinafter the WHO.  
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changes by any administration or political party seeking reelection. Such pressures 
may prevent the conclusion of an FTA in the first place, where the interested lobbies 
are sufficiently influential in legislative bodies.                                 
2. Policy Concerns for Specific IPR Forms 
a. Geographical Indications 
 The U.S. favors trademarks over GIs in its FTAs as was pointed out by Vivas-
Eugui and Spennemann
506
. Other IPR areas like patents for pharmaceuticals and 
copyrights for software and entertainment are of even more importance to the U.S.
507
 
In the instance of GIs, the U.S. uses the TRIPS flexibility to implement its obligations 
through its trademark laws.
508
 However, some U.S. agricultural interests like the 
"Napa valley producers", have begun requesting U.S. positions that are more favorable 
towards GIs.
509
 Thus far, these parties with GI interests have not been influential in 
the U.S. IPR policy making process.  
The U.S. position stems from the logical argument that GIs are public 
designations, while IPR deals with private rights.
510
 In the context where GIs intersect 
with an IPR, trademarks are the preferred option as illustrated by the FTAs.
511
 Here 
the U.S. places GIs on the same footing as trademarks.
512
 This practice is commonly 
known as “first in time, first in right”.513 This means that a trademark could be given 
                                                
506 David Vivas-Eugui & Christophe Spennemann, UNCTAD/ICTSD Project on Intellectual 
Property and Sustainable Development, The Treatment of Geographical Indications in Recent Regional 
and Bilateral Free Trade Agreements (May 2006), available at: 
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=4812 (last visited Sept.18, 2007). 
507Id, at 19.    
508
Vivas-Eugui & Spennemann, supra note 506, at 19. 
509Vivas-Eugui & Spennemann, supra note 506, at 19. 
510Vivas-Eugui & Spennemann, supra note 506, at 19. 
511Vivas-Eugui & Spennemann, supra note 506, at 19. 
512Vivas-Eugui & Spennemann, supra note 506, at 23.   
513Vivas-Eugui & Spennemann, supra note 506, at 23.     
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priority over a GI if applied first.
514
 A counter argument could be that GIs develop by 
accumulation through generations, and thus should be offered priority.
515
  
This area is not one of great policy concern to Egypt, as it has already 
incorporated GIs in its IPR Law under the trademarks provisions. An outstanding 
problem is that this Law does not include the additional level of protection currently 
granted for wines and spirits, pursuant to Articles 23 – 24 of the TRIPS. A TRIPS 
Minus Law would make a country ineligible to join an FTA with the U.S. This is even 
true in areas of little interest for the U.S like GIs. Recognizing a TRIPS deficient legal 
system and concluding an FTA with Egypt could potentially embarrass the U.S. 
government before its public. The U.S. cannot afford to forgo any opportunity to 
pressure Egypt into compliance with its international IPR obligations and thus open 
the door to further legal enhancements in areas such as data exclusivity.     
b. Copyright and Related Rights 
 One critical policy issue of the FTAs is the prohibition of parallel importation 
even if the right holder has already sold its product abroad. Third parties cannot then 
import such legitimately acquired products from abroad, unless they have the holder's 
consent. Abbott explains that the issue of parallel importation is not covered by U.S. 
case law.
516
 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed only the exhaustion of copyright for the 
first sale inside the U.S.
517
 The texts of the FTAs, which are binding to the U.S. 
                                                
514Vivas-Eugui & Spennemann, supra note 506, at 23.   
515Vivas-Eugui & Spennemann, supra note 506, at 23.   
516
Frederick M. Abbott, ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, 
International Centre or Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Intellectual Property Provisions 
of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements in Light of U.S. Federal Law (January 2006), available at: 
http://www.3dthree.org/pdf_3D/3DCESCRMorocco_April06Eng.pdf  (last visited Sept.18, 2007), at 
21.  
517Id, at 21.  
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courts, have now become complementary on the issue of exhaustion by prohibiting 
parallel importation.
518
  
In contrast, Egypt enables exhaustion in copyrights and related rights, for both 
selling inside its territory and abroad. Egyptian IPR legislators want to provide 
consumers with wider varieties of prices offered by parallel importation. This may 
lead to the availability of the copyrighted works at cheaper prices in Egypt. This can 
happen if the right holder has already sold his work in a country with a more cost 
efficient capacity. Egypt may also be able to advantageously compare prices among 
several countries if the copyright holder has authorized publication in all of them. 
Accordingly, there is little chance that Egyptian policy makers would be ready to 
sacrifice such an advantage. The only exception would be if all key areas of 
copyrights are adequately covered by distribution agreements between the right 
holders and Egypt at reduced prices. This would make parallel importation of minimal 
significance for Egypt, which is not yet the case.  
c. Patents 
TRIPS Plus patent provisions constitute serious threats to public health 
protection efforts in developing countries, and thus cannot be accepted by Egypt. 
Berger and Prabhala point out that FTAs favor patent holders, even beyond their 
initial expectations when they acquired their exclusive patent rights.
519
 This happens 
because the scope of patentability is extended to areas that were not included under 
the patent when the patent holders applied for their patents.
520
 The same fact is true of 
                                                
518
Abbott, supra note 516, at 22.  
519Jonathan Berger & Achal Prabhala, Assessing The Impact of TRIPs-Plus Patent Rules in 
The Proposed US-SACU Free Trade Agreement, (Feb. 17, 2005), available at: 
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/capacity/tza2_oxfamreport_pricing_financing.pdf (last visited April 2, 
2008), at 8.   
520Id, at 8. 
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even more essential areas like "fixed-dose combination (FDC)".
521
 This kind of 
treatment relies of new combinations of existing pharmaceuticals.
522
 Such 
combinations are now patentable under the FTAs as therapeutic methods.
523
  
FTAs also prohibit parallel importation of patented products. This prohibition 
of parallel importation limits price options in developing countries.
524
 Another 
problem of this prohibition is that it overrides, in practice, the results of the difficult 
WTO negotiations on the "Relationship between the TRIPS and Public Health".
525
 In 
these negotiations, developing countries managed to get the approval from their 
developed trading partners to provide more TRIPS flexibilities.
526
 Such flexibilities 
enabled countries, without capacity or with insufficient capacity in their 
pharmaceuticals industry, to import patented products produced under the compulsory 
licensing system.
527
 Applying the FTAs prohibition to parallel importation prevents 
developing countries from using the TRIPS flexibilities to get pharmaceuticals 
supplies.
528
 To the contrary, Egypt's IPR Law grants parallel importation thus creating 
another problem that needs to be resolved.    
Revocation of patents is limited under the FTAs to the same reasons that 
would justify the refusal of the original patent application.
529
 Grounds for refusal are 
usually founded on insufficiency of the patent conditions or misrepresentation of 
information by the applicant. Article 5(A)(3) of the Paris Convention enables 
revocation of patents if the compulsory licensing is insufficient.
530
 This would 
                                                
521Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 8. 
522Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 8. 
523Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 8.  
524Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.  
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Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.  
526Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.  
527Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.   
528Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.   
529Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.   
530Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.   
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normally occur in cases of abuse of the patent by its holder.
531
 The revocation of the 
patent would still enable the holder to use the formerly patented product, but without 
exclusivity.
532
 Therefore, this limits the options for developing countries if abuse of 
the patents rights occurs.
533
 The Egyptian IPR Law does not accept this limitation, as 
it endorses the revocation options offered by both the TRIPS and Paris Convention.
534
 
A further aspect is that the Law allows expropriation of patents with relatively flexible 
conditions.
535
 
          Linking patents to marketing approvals for pharmaceuticals is a big challenge to 
developing countries as it requires sophisticated database facilities.
536
 This link, as 
required by the FTAs, would oblige the authority which issues marketing approvals to 
confirm whether the product of concern is patented.
537
 This cross checking process 
aims to prevent the issuance of marketing approval for non - patent holders.
538
 The 
problem with this issue is that the status of the patent tends to be dynamic in terms of 
its termination or additions.
539
 An equivalently dynamic patent database must be 
available for developing countries to be able to comply with such an obligation. 
Another limitation is the one concerning the suspension of the Bolar Provision if this 
link is applied.  This Provision allows third parties to prepare for marketing approval 
during the patent duration. However, they cannot start marketing the patented product 
except after the lapse of the patent period.   
                                                
531Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.   
532Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.   
533Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at 9.   
534Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at Article 26.   
535Berger & Prabhala, supra note 519, at Article 25.    
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 The Egyptian Law acknowledges none of the above mentioned TRIPS Plus 
aspects. The language of the Law on patents is drafted to make maximum use of the 
TRIPS flexibilities. The main reason for this flexible language is to alleviate public 
skepticism about the monopolistic effects of patents, and their consequences on prices. 
Egyptian policy makers still adhere to negotiating positions that favor TRIPS 
flexibilities. This is self - evident from the terms of Egypt's preferential agreements 
with the E.C., EFTA and Turkey. 
d. Data Exclusivity 
 Egyptian policy makers are most wary of attempts by developed countries to 
force Egypt to adopt the concept of data exclusivity instead of undisclosed 
information. International reports strongly warn developing countries about the 
negative effects of data exclusivity on access to medicines. The warning reports are 
released by credible U.N. international organizations such as the WHO and the 
UNCTAD.  
For example, the WHO issues a series of reports under the name "WHO Policy 
Perspectives on Medicines". The third report in the series explained that trade 
liberalization can increase developing countries access to non - patented 
pharmaceuticals.
540
 This would be the result of lowered tariffs on pharmaceuticals that 
would definitely push down their prices.
541
 However, if the countries do not draft their 
IPR laws properly they might not enjoy this advantage in pharmaceutical prices.
542
 
Developing countries must be accordingly cautious about the adoption of TRIPS Plus 
measures like data exclusivity.
543
  
                                                
540
Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharmaceuticals, WHO Policy Perspectives on 
Medicines, March 3, 2001, available at: http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/regulations1.pdf (last visited Jan. 
30, 2008), at 1-2.     
541Id, at 1-2.     
542Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharmaceuticals, supra note 540, at 3.  
543Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharmaceuticals, supra note 540,at 1.  
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Another WHO report explains that pharmaceuticals are governed by two main 
legal systems: drug regulatory and intellectual property.
544
 The former governs the 
safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, while the latter protects the fruits of creativity 
in general.
545
 Data exclusivity is defended by its advocates because it bridges the two 
systems.
546
 This bridging may lead to some unethical results such as the redundancy 
of administrative costs pertaining to marketing approval.
547
 This repeated cost might 
also push many generic based companies out of the market because they would have 
less competitive capacity compared to the original manufacturers.
548
 Eventually, 
consumer access to medicines would be more limited.
549
 In addition, data exclusivity 
could make compulsory licensing pointless, since generic pharmaceuticals would be 
denied registration altogether during the protection period.
550
 Other effects of data 
exclusivity might be the practical extension of patent terms, or to create de facto 
patents for non patented products.
551
  
Interestingly, the WHO report asserts that data exclusivity is a TRIPS Plus 
measure.
552
 This conclusion is derived from the objectives of Article 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.
553
 These objectives are centered around the concept of prevention of 
unfair commercial use.
554
 The acceptance of the original "full clinical trials" by the 
competent authorities is sufficient under the TRIPS to grant marketing approval for 
                                                
544Briefing Note on access to Medicine, Regional Office for South east Asia, World Health 
Organization, March 2006, available at: 
http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Prevention_and_Control_BF_MAR06.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 
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545Id, at 3.   
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550Briefing Note on access to Medicine, supra note 544,at 2.  
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pharmaceuticals. In case of this acceptance, third parties are waived from the 
requirement of submitting their own test data. This waiver should not be understood as 
an act of unfair commercial use.
555
 If third parties rely on previously accepted test 
data, then, no claims of unfair commercial use on grounds of "industrial espionage" 
can be proven.
556
 Regardless, no such espionage is possible if the data isn't secret.
557
 
This point is confirmed in a UNCTAD
558
 – ICTSD559 publication.560 Despite the 
several interpretations of Article 39, developing countries are facilitating the entry of 
new generic drugs to their markets.
561
 This is done by conforming to the secrecy 
criteria set out in Article 39.
562
                                            
 At the WTO level no cases have been filed on grounds that data exclusivity 
has been violated. The only exception has been a request for consultation with 
Argentina submitted by the U.S. to the WTO DSB.
563
 This submission enumerated a 
number of IP violations including data exclusivity.
564
 This case, however, was not 
elevated to a DSB panel since the two parties reached a common resolution that was 
notified to WTO.
565
 This case resolution did not include any obligations by Argentina 
to apply data exclusivity. However, it allowed the U.S. to preserve the right to resort 
to the DSB in the future for the same issue.
566
 The question remains, does the U.S. 
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have a viable legal position in its interpretation of Article 39 of the TRIPS? If the 
answer is affirmative, why hasn't the U.S. taken the issue to the DSB instead of 
directly pressuring developing countries to adopt data exclusivity? The logical answer 
is that the U.S. policy makers know that they will not win on their position in the 
WTO. 
B. Conclusion 
 The Egypt has two levels of IPR protection to consider, the TRIPS and TRIPS 
Plus. Egypt is already a WTO member, but its IPR Law still does not comply with 
TRIPS provisions. Egypt's required compliance must be given priority by Egyptian 
policy makers despite TRIPS opposition. Many critics of the TRIPS fail to put the 
overall advantages of the international trade context into consideration. The critics 
take their short sighted views to a public that falls victim of stereotyped propaganda 
messages about the negative effects of globalization. The TRIPS is a fact of Egyptian 
foreign policy. Non – compliance with the TRIPS can thus affect any trade interest for 
Egypt. Critics must know that non - compliance with the TRIPS can only lead to 
discrediting the image of Egypt in international forums. Any clear IPR violation that is 
met with inaction by trading partners is a sign of devaluation of Egypt as a developing 
country. This would only damage foreign direct investment (FDI) opportunities, and 
consequently, hinder Egypt's economic growth.  
 As explained in Chapter 3, Egypt's IPR Law does not comply with its 
international obligations. Some provisions of the Law are poorly drafted.  
Inconsistencies among the 4 Books are rife in terms of arrangement and language 
used. Areas of deficiency in the Law must be remedied before Egypt undertakes any 
serious joint FTA preparations with the U.S. Otherwise, negotiating with the U.S. 
would only expose the Law's weaknesses, and the U.S. administration will never to 
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able to convince the Congress to approve an FTA with Egypt. Accordingly, a review 
of the Law with is recommended with special emphasis on the following aspects: 
1. Stating patent holders' rights in explicit terms in accordance with Article 28 of the 
TRIPS. 
2. Reconsidering the expansive grounds for compulsory licensing endorsed by 
Article 23 of the Law. 
3. Reflecting the amendment of Article 31 of the TRIPS in Article 24.1 of the Law to 
enable the importation and exportation of pharmaceuticals produced under the 
compulsory licensing system.             
4. Stating the rights conferred to trademarks holders in explicit terms in accordance 
with Article 16 of the TRIPS. 
5. The inclusion of the additional level of GIs protection for wines and spirits in the 
Law, in accordance with Articles 23-24 of the TRIPS. 
6. Specifying whether GIs shall be applied for services.  
7. Reconsidering the necessity of including compulsory licensing for industrial 
designs. 
8. Applying the conditions stipulated in Article 13 of the TRIPS for limitations on 
copyrights. 
9. Assuring that Egypt has the right to apply the translation exceptions of 
copyrighted works into Arabic, otherwise this provision must be omitted. 
10. Strengthening criminal remedies in the Law. 
11. Expediting accession to the UPOV and amending Book 4 of the Law in 
accordance. 
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When Egyptian policymakers assure that the Law is in conformity with 
international obligations, the FTA could be considered. Comparatively, the Law falls 
short of FTA standards. Some potential areas of sacrifices must be determined. Egypt 
needs to select its policy options for FTA negotiations in view of its public interests. 
The most critical point is to protect its citizens' access to medicines as already 
provided by the TRIPS. Data exclusivity measures must be avoided at all costs. The 
same is true for putting serious limitations on compulsory licensing grounds. 
Meanwhile, the unnecessary extensiveness of compulsory licensing grounds in the 
Law should be reconsidered. Linking patents to marketing approvals could also have 
negative effects on public health policy, and thus must be avoided. The consequences 
of time compensation for the unreasonably prolonged patent or marketing approval 
procedures lack clarity. In all cases, TRIPS Plus measures regarding undisclosed 
information and patents must be nonnegotiable. The Government of Egypt would face 
strong resistance if it tries to negotiate in these two areas.      
In contrast, other IPR forms might be improved by applying some FTAs 
measures. Areas like trademarks have no public interests contraindicating further 
protection. The only point of question is the government’s capacity to carry out any 
further commitments. For example, the FTAs oblige their parties to apply e – filing for 
trademarks applications.  The implementation of this obligation by Egypt could be 
facilitated by technical assistance provided by the U.S. Likewise, there is also no 
social dimension to applying TRIPS Plus measures to industrial designs. Enhanced 
copyright protection could be a point of FDI attraction, especially for the computer 
software industry. Egypt has sufficient skilled labor in this field which would benefit 
by more job opportunities if foreign investment inflows increase. Another point of 
comparative advantage for Egyptian software professionals is their ability to develop 
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Arabic software, which is in highly demand in Arab countries. Fears about 
dissemination of knowledge if the current level of copyright protection is elevated 
could be avoided by concluding agreements with publishers at reduced prices.  
It is pointless to adhere to the TRIPS level of border measures which are only 
complementary to enforcement efforts already exerted in the domestic market. Better 
border enforcement can rather relieve such domestic efforts by blocking surges of IPR 
infringing imports from entering the market. Egypt can apply border measures to 
exportation and free zones at minimal costs, and thus be more eligible to join an FTA 
with the U.S. Border measures are issued in Egypt by a ministerial decree. The 
inclusion of the TRIPS Plus border measures is easy compared to the amendment of 
the IPR Law, which would have to be passed by the People's Assembly (the 
Parliament) pending a presidential decree for the official issuance. The better 
enforcement of IPR also has other important roles in consumer protection.  
Finally, Egypt can consider some of the TRIPS Plus provisions in areas of less 
social sensitivity. These could be offered instead of the U.S. demands of TRIPS Plus 
measures in patents or data exclusivity. Another approach might be to trade off other 
international trade areas like investment facilitation or trade in services with IPR. 
However, if the U.S. insists during the negotiations on applying TRIPS Plus to these 
fields, Egypt should make a clear assessment of the exact negative consequences for 
its social interests. The results of this assessment would constitute a stronger ground 
for bargaining with the U.S. than the absolute rejection of the whole matter. Empirical 
evidence of these negative effects could constitute persuasive arguments for Egypt 
that the ensuing costs of the U.S. demands are intolerable to its current level of 
development. Egypt can also request the U.S. to provide aid to Egyptian segments that 
would be seriously affected by the adoption of the TRIPS Plus provisions in health 
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related fields. Many programs could be planned in this regard like the participation of 
the U.S. pharmaceuticals companies in offering their products at reduced prices to the 
most vulnerable social segments. Another alternative is expanding and improving the 
health insurance coverage programs to make them more reliable for Egyptians.  
The remaining challenge to concluding an FTA between Egypt and the U.S. is 
the role of any hidden political agendas of the respective White House 
administrations. It is probable that these agendas played a critical role in aborting 
former FTA plans, and preventing officials on both sides from even starting the 
negotiations process. If the political barriers are still in place, then there is little chance 
that any FTA can be concluded. The mystery remains as to reasons behind the U.S. 
introduction of the FTA preparations in the first place. The withdrawal by the U.S. of 
the FTA preparations without disclosure of reasons leaves the Egyptians with 
questions about wasting time and efforts in pursuing the FTA. With this withdrawal, 
did the U.S. intend then to convey a message to the Egyptians that the democracy 
achievements of Egypt are still weak to enable an FTA conclusion? If so, is Egypt 
deficient in terms of democracy in comparison with other Arab countries that are 
already parties to FTAs with the U.S.? Some of these countries have human rights 
records that are the same or even worse than that of Egypt. U.S. reasons remain 
veiled.    
In conclusion, the U.S. highly politicizes its decisions for joining FTAs with 
Arab countries. The political factor is crucial for all U.S. FTAs regardless of the level 
of development of its trading partners. However, this political factor is magnified 
while making FTA decisions concerning the Middle East, currently the most turbulent 
region in the world. The U.S. decision making process becomes more complicated for 
key Middle Eastern countries like Egypt which is endowed with a large population, 
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strategic location and great role in the Middle East stability. Egypt's advantages 
should facilitate the conclusion of an FTA with the U.S. Objective assessment of the 
commercial and political benefits of an FTA with Egypt would probably encourage 
the U.S. to seek its conclusion. A clear indication of the greater potential for the FTA 
to come into being is the elevation of Egypt in the 2008 USTR Special 301 Report 
from the "Priority Watch List" to the "Watch List".
567
 In addition, the 2008 NTE 
Report has diluted its criticism of IP protection in Egypt.
568
 In its 2008 conclusions, 
the USTR acknowledged Egyptian improvements in the fields of patent inspection and 
marketing approvals.                      
The biggest obstacle to this FTA seems to be the confused policy of the Bush 
Administration in the Middle East. The offensive agenda of this Administration may 
obscure the U.S vision of its bilateral interests with these countries. This agenda also 
deprives the U.S. of developing a clear regional approach for the Middle East, 
especially compared with that of the E.C. The coming U.S. presidential elections may 
result in a more rational Administration that would reform the U.S. foreign policy and 
lead to greater trade opportunities.   
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